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Executive summary
This study was produced in response to the federal gov-
ernment’s  request  for  an  assessment  of  the  macroeco-
nomic  and  fiscal  impact  of  the  risk  capital  allowance. 
More particularly, it aimed to assess the degree to which 
the objectives of the law of 22 June 2005 introducing a 
tax allowance for risk capital have been achieved. This 
study could not have been finalised without the assistance 
of a tax authority of the FPS Finance, as it was essential 
to obtain a number of detailed, unpublished data on cor-
poration tax for the 2007 tax year. These data were made 
available to the Bank on 9 July 2008.
It should be noted that the tax allowance for risk capital 
is relatively recent and that an economic assessment of 
its impact is not always easy in these circumstances, par-
ticularly as regards the measure’s dynamic effects or its 
impact at the most disaggregated level. It was therefore 
necessary to make a number of assumptions. Although 
this exercise aimed at maximum accuracy, there are still 
some areas where the estimates are only approximate. It 
was therefore decided to assess a range within which the 
net fiscal impact of the measure for the 2007 tax year is 
likely to fall. It was also necessary to confine the sectoral 
approach to an estimation of the gross fiscal impact of 
the risk capital allowance, as the data are still too frag-
mentary to attempt any disaggregated quantification of 
its secondary effects on employment, investment or the 
public finances.
The  introduction  of  the  risk  capital  allowance  led  to  a 
structural change in the financial behaviour of companies, 
as it was very much in their interests to adapt their finan-
cial structure to take full advantage of the tax concession. 
It  could  therefore  be  to  their  advantage  to  establish  a 
subsidiary or to operate via finance companies.
One aim of the tax reform was to strengthen the solvency 
of companies established in Belgium. In that regard, a very 
marked increase in shareholders’ equity and authorised 
capital was recorded in 2006 and 2007. This increase was 
due to capital contributions of both Belgian and foreign 
origin.
Nonetheless, the real impact on corporate solvency must 
be qualified, as the very strong rise in equity capital is 
due largely to investments by Belgian companies in the 
shares of other companies, in most cases for tax reasons. 
However, such transactions did not bring any improve-
ment in the solvency of Belgian companies, if viewed on 
a consolidated basis.
On the other hand, the inflow of foreign capital, notably 
via the replacement of current borrowings with shares in 
company capital and the formation of finance companies, 
did in fact strengthen the solvency of companies estab-
lished in Belgium. That is also true of capital increases 
financed by households. In 2006 and 2007 there was a 
*  The data used in this study have been provided by the General Statistics 
Department, the Microeconomic Information Department and the Research 
Department of the Bank, as well as by the FPS Finance. The authors would like to 
express their gratitude to all persons having made a contribution.
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sharp rise in both the expansion of shareholders’ equity 
resulting from inflows of foreign capital and that financed 
by households. This shows that the solvency of compa-
nies in Belgium increased following the introduction of 
the risk capital allowance. The relatively slower growth of 
debt financing, primarily in SMEs, during the 2006-2007 
economic boom seems to indicate that firms are making 
less use of this source of funding and more use of equity 
capital,  so  that  the  solvency  of  that  type  of  firms  has 
improved.
The  risk  capital  allowance  was  also  designed  to  make 
Belgium more attractive from the tax angle, and to offer 
an alternative to the coordination centres, which are des-
tined to lose their special tax status shortly. The way in 
which the risk capital allowance is applied makes Belgium 
an attractive location for multinational groups to set up 
their financial centres there. The introduction of the risk 
capital allowance seems to have procured a trend reversal, 
limiting the outflow of capital from the coordination cen-
tres which have lost their approval. However, it should be 
pointed out that this is still a very provisional finding, since 
some of the largest coordination centres only lost their 
approval very recently and others still have an approval. 
On the basis of the tax returns for the 2006 and 2007 tax 
years, it seems that a number of the coordination centres 
whose approval had not yet expired nevertheless opted to 
apply the risk capital allowance. At the same time, there 
has been a marked rise in the number of other finance 
companies of Belgian or foreign origin, particularly the 
finance centres of international groups.
The introduction of the risk capital allowance has undeni-
ably had a considerable impact in terms of financial flows. 
Conversely, the impact on the real economy, measured 
via a simulation based on the Bank’s econometric model, 
seems to be fairly limited in the short term, but it may 
become a little more noticeable in the medium term. On 
the  assumption  that  the  tax  reform  will  be  neutral  for 
the  government  budget,  companies’  gross  investments 
in  fixed  assets  can  be  expected  to  increase  by  around 
400 million euro over a five-year period, while the posi-
tive effect on employment will be around 3,000 jobs. In 
the  case  of  the  coordination  centres,  there  are  signs 
that employment has contracted, but there has been a 
partial shift towards other companies within the group. 
Nonetheless, the fall in employment would in any case 
have  been  larger  without  the  introduction  of  the  risk 
capital allowance. Moreover, some jobs are being created, 
albeit on a limited scale, in the new finance centres being 
set up by multinational groups.
Finally, the study assessed the impact on the budget of 
the  risk  capital  allowance  and  the  other  measures  laid 
down by the law of 22 June 2005. In order to conduct 
this assessment, it is necessary to distinguish between the 
gross tax advantage represented by the risk capital allow-
ance for Belgian companies and the net impact of that 
measure on public revenues.
The  gross  tax  advantage  for  companies  increased  con-
siderably owing to the marked rise in equity capital. The 
gross cost of the reform was already around 2.4 billion 
euro in 2006, on the basis of the tax returns. However, 
the net impact on the budget is much smaller. It is limited 
by the proceeds of the compensatory measures, the main 
one being the amendment of the definition of tax-exempt 
capital gains. Furthermore, the inflow of foreign capital 
does in principle not mean any reduction in corporation 
tax revenues for the Belgian government, but quite the 
contrary. Nor is that the case in regard to the application 
of the risk capital allowance by the companies which have 
taken over the activities of the coordination centres. On 
the basis of data which are still provisional and taking into 
account wide uncertainty margins, the net cost to public 
finances in 2006 of the measures introduced by the law of 
22 June 2005 is estimated at between 140 and 430 mil-
lion euro.
Macroeconomic  analysis  also  shows  that  the  measures 
introduced by the law of 22 June 2005 have so far had 
at most only a limited negative effect on corporation tax 
revenues. Both the movement in these tax revenues and 
the absence of any decline in the implicit rates indicate 
that there has so far been no significant negative effect 
on public revenues.
However, the conclusions of the analysis of the risk capital 
allowance’s impact on public finances must be considered 
provisional, since the measure’s dynamic effects are not 
yet fully apparent.
In that regard, it is reasonable to expect future years to 
bring a further increase in the gross tax advantage which 
Belgian companies enjoy. Some of the factors behind that 
increase are unlikely to depress public finances, and could 
even prove positive if they lead to an expansion of the 
corporation tax base in Belgium, particularly as a result 
of the process of allocating profits between the various 
companies in the same international group. The positive 
influence of the macroeconomic payback effects on public 
revenues could also increase slightly.
Conversely, various other factors could depress corpora-
tion tax revenues. These include the increase in the rate 
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the previously unused part of the risk capital allowance, 
and the changes made to the structure of companies or 
groups of companies in the context of tax optimisation 
techniques. Some of these factors could have a considera-
ble impact. It is therefore possible that the public revenues 
generated by corporation tax could suffer a substantial 
adverse effect in the future.
It is not yet possible to estimate accurately the effect that 
the risk capital allowance will have on public finances in 
the future. It will depend, in particular, on what happens 
regarding the various factors mentioned above, the eco-
nomic context and the latter’s influence on the operat-
ing surplus of companies, and the movement in interest 
rates. In this regard it should be noted that the cost to 
the budget may increase, particularly in a situation where 
the operating surplus of companies declines significantly 
and interest rates rise. Finally, the impact of the tax reform 
will depend on the degree to which companies resort to 
tax  optimisation  techniques  and  the  application  of  the 
relevant rules.
Introduction
This study examines the macroeconomic and fiscal impact 
of  the  risk  capital  allowance.  It  thus  responds  to  the 
request made by the federal government to the National 
Bank of Belgium in March 2008.
This  study  could  not  have  been  finalised  without  the 
assistance of the FPS Finance, as it was essential to obtain 
a number of detailed, unpublished data on the corpora-
tion tax for the 2007 tax year. These data were made 
available to the Bank on 9 July 2008.
It should be noted that the risk capital measure is relatively 
recent and that an economic assessment of its impact is 
not  always  easy  in  these  circumstances,  particularly  as 
regards  the  measure’s  dynamic  effects  or  its  impact  at 
the  most  disaggregated  level.  It  was  therefore  neces-
sary  to  make  a  number  of  assumptions.  Although  this 
exercise aimed at maximum accuracy, there are still some 
areas where the estimates are only approximate. It was 
therefore decided to assess a range within which the net 
fiscal impact of the measure for the 2007 tax year is likely 
to fall. It was also necessary to confine the approach by 
branch  of  activity  to  the  estimation  of  the  gross  fiscal 
impact of the risk capital allowance, as the data are still 
too fragmentary to attempt any disaggregated quantifica-
tion of its secondary effects on employment, investment 
or public finances.
Introduced by the law of 22 June 2005  (1), the risk capital 
allowance  –  more  commonly  known  as  the  “notional 
interest  deduction”  –  took  effect  from  the  2007  tax 
year. It enables companies liable for corporation tax to 
deduct from their tax base a notional amount of interest 
calculated on the basis of their adjusted equity capital. 
This arrangement is unique in the sense that no other 
European Union Member State applies a general system 
of this type  (2).
By this innovative measure, the federal government of the 
day aimed to achieve various objectives, as revealed by the 
explanatory memorandum to the draft law.
First,  the  measure  is  intended  to  make  Belgium  more 
attractive from the tax angle for both Belgian and foreign 
investors. It should therefore be assessed in the light of 
the international trend towards lower nominal corporate 
tax rates. The same motive lay behind the marked reduc-
tion in nominal tax rates on corporate profits, which took 















































(1)  Unweighted average.
(1)  Law of 22 June 2005 introducing a tax allowance for risk capital (published in the 
Moniteur belge on 30 June 2005).
(2)  In Croatia, a universal system of tax allowance for equity capital was applied 
between 1994 and 2001. Brazil and New Zealand have also used a similar 
arrangement in the past. The same applies to Austria and Italy, although the tax 
allowance there only applied to increases in capital. In Ireland, Luxembourg and 
Switzerland, certain categories of companies are eligible for a tax regime which 
includes the deduction of notional interest.10
The measure also aims to boost the equity capital of com-
panies – and hence to improve their solvency – by attenu-
ating the discrimination under the tax rules between debt 
financing and equity financing. The whole of the interest 
payable on borrowings can normally be deducted as an 
operating expense, whereas the profits constituting the 
remuneration of the equity are taxed in full.
Finally, the measure endeavours to offer a credible alter-
native to the special tax regime applicable to coordination 
centres in Belgium, as that system has now entered its 
final phase and will soon be abolished.
As well as introducing the risk capital allowance, the law 
of 22 June 2005 abolished the 0.5 p.c. registration fee 
on contributions to companies. At the same time, com-
pensatory measures were introduced to ensure that the 
reform was neutral overall in its effect on the government 
budget.
This study tries to assess the degree to which the objec-
tives  announced  have  been  attained.  Chapter  1  gives 
a brief presentation of the measures introduced by the 
law of 22 June 2005. Chapter 2 analyses the impact of 
these measures on the financial structure of corporations. 
Chapter 3 discusses the coordination centres. Chapter 4 
examines  the  macroeconomic  impact  of  the  risk  capi-
tal  allowance,  particularly  its  effect  on  investment  and 
employment. Chapter 5 explains the budgetary implica-
tions  on  the  basis  of  both  macroeconomic  and  micro-
economic data, and the transition between the gross tax 
advantage which Belgian companies obtain from the risk 
capital allowance – according to data broken down by 
branch of activity – and the net impact of the measure 
on the government budget. The main findings are sum-
marised in the executive summary.
It  should  be  stressed  that  this  study  of  the  macroeco-
nomic and fiscal impact of the risk capital allowance is 
based partly on data which are still provisional. There are 
also many dynamic effects of which the future pattern is 
uncertain. At present it is therefore only possible to offer 
a provisional assessment of this corporation tax reform. 
A final overall view will only be obtainable in several years’ 
time, once the coordination centre tax regime has been 
phased out and the full effect of the reform has made 
itself felt.
1.  Content of the law of 22 June 2005
The risk capital allowance was introduced by the law of 
22 June 2005, which also abolished the 0.5 p.c. registra-
tion fee on contributions to companies. The law simulta-
neously introduced a number of other measures designed 
to  neutralise  the  impact  on  the  budget.  This  section 
presents briefly the provisions of this law.
1.1    Risk capital allowance
The risk capital allowance enables companies liable for 
corporation tax to deduct from their tax base an amount 
of  notional  interest  calculated  on  the  basis  of  their 
“adjusted” shareholders’ equity.
The  rate  of  the  risk  capital  allowance  is  equal  to  the 
average interest rate on ten-year linear bonds issued by 
the Belgian State for the penultimate year before the tax 
year. This means that it is the average interest rate for 
2005 (3.442 p.c.) that applies to the 2007 tax year. Since 
interest rates have been rising, the rate is 3.781 p.c. for 
the 2008 tax year and 4.307 p.c. for the 2009 tax year. 
The rate of the risk capital allowance cannot deviate in 
any year by more than one percentage point from the 
rate applied in the preceding tax year, nor may it ever 
exceed 6.5 p.c. For SMEs, the allowance rate is increased 
by 0.5 percentage point. Moreover, SMEs can opt not to 
apply the risk capital allowance and to continue using the 
tax-exempt investment reserve regime  (1).
The risk capital allowance applies to all resident compa-
nies and to permanent establishments of foreign compa-
nies located in Belgium and subject to corporation tax in 
Belgium  (2). Only companies covered by a tax regime that 
is  different  from  that  under  ordinary  law,  such  as  the 
approved  coordination  centres,  conversion  companies, 
investment  companies,  cooperative  holding  companies 
and shipping companies are excluded from this tax allow-
ance regime.
The risk capital to be taken into account corresponds to 
the equity capital as recorded in the annual accounts of 
companies minus certain amounts. It is equal to items I 
to VI on the liabilities side of the balance sheet : capital, 
share premiums, revaluation gains, reserves, profit carried 
forward and capital subsidies. The adjustments made to 
(1)  It should be pointed out that the definition of an SME differs according to 
whether it is the 0.5 percentage point increase in the risk capital allowance that 
is being considered, or the option of choosing between the risk capital allowance 
and the tax-exempt reserve regime.
(2)  The risk capital allowance also applies to foreign companies which have 
immovable property in Belgium, and to non-profit organisations and foundations 
which are subject to Belgian corporation tax.MacroeconoMic and fiscal iMpact of  
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the  basis  for  calculating  the  risk  capital  allowance  are 
intended to prevent cumulative tax allowances, to exclude 
assets  which  are  tax-exempt  in  Belgium  under  double 
taxation agreements, and to prevent potential abuse.
In order to prevent cumulative tax allowances, the equity 
capital is reduced by the net fiscal value of the company’s 
own shares, financial fixed assets consisting of participat-
ing interests and other equity, and the shares issued by 
investment companies whose income, if any, is deduct-
ible as finally taxed income. It is also reduced by the net 
accounting value attributed to permanent establishments 
or immovable property located abroad, the net account-
ing  value  of  assets  which  are  unreasonably  in  excess 
of business needs, the accounting value of asset items 
held as portfolio investments which are not destined to 
produce regular income (works of art, gold, etc.) and the 
accounting value of property used for private purposes. 
Finally, capital gains expressed but not realised and capital 
subsidies  are  also  excluded.  Any  change  in  the  equity 
occurring  during  the  tax  period  is  considered  pro  rata 
temporis  (1). If the tax base is not sufficient for the risk 
capital  allowance  to  be  applied,  the  allowance  can  be 
carried forward for seven years.
The risk capital allowance took effect from the 2007 tax 
year  and  therefore  applies  to  corporate  profits  realised 
from  2006  onwards.  Presumably,  most  companies  will 
therefore have taken this measure into account in their 
advance payments of corporation tax in 2006.
For  companies  established  in  Belgium,  the  risk  capital 
allowance means a reduction in the effective corporate 
tax rate. Its exact impact depends on the return on equity 
of the company. Thus, for the 2007 tax year, in the case 
of a company subject to a nominal tax rate of 33.99 p.c., 
without  other  tax  deductions  and  having  a  return  on 
equity of 15 p.c. before tax (if the equity is not subject to 
any adjustment), this measure reduces the effective rate 
of tax to 26.2 p.c. For a company with a return on equity 
before tax of only 5 p.c., the effective tax rate is reduced 
to 10.6 p.c. The measure is therefore highly advantageous 
for finance companies which have substantial equity capi-
tal and which make a return on their loans which is only 
slightly higher than the rate on government bonds.
1.2    Abolition of the registration fee on 
contributions to companies
The  law  of  22  June  2005  also  abolished  de  facto  the 
registration  fee  on  contributions  to  companies,  as  the 
rate of 0.5 p.c. was cut to zero whether the contribution 
concerns movable property, certain immovable property 
or increases in the authorised capital. This part of the law 
came into effect on 1 January 2006.
1.3    Fiscal compensatory measures
The law of 22 June 2005 also introduced a series of meas-
ures designed to neutralise the impact on the government 
budget of the introduction of the risk capital allowance 
and the abolition of registration fees on contributions to 
companies.
The  main  fiscal  compensatory  measure  concerns  the 
amendment  to  the  definition  of  realised  capital  gains 
which  are  tax-exempt,  either  finally  or  temporarily. 
Henceforth,  the  charges  relating  to  the  realisation  of 
capital gains have to be deducted from the amount of the 
capital gains before the tax exemption applies. This con-
cerns in particular the costs of advertising, notary’s fees, 
agents’ fees, bank charges and the taxes on transactions 
associated with the realisation of capital gains. Since such 
costs are already tax deductible as business expenses, this 
is a way of avoiding a duplication of the tax relief.
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CHART 2 R ETURN ON EQUITY AND EFFECTIVE TAX RATE (1)
  (percentages)
Source : NBB.
(1)  The chart is based on the rate of the risk capital allowance initially applicable 
(2007 tax year), namely 3.442 p.c.
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DIAGRAM 1  REPLACEMENT OF BORROWINGS WITH EQUITY
Assets Assets Liabilities Liabilities Company AC ompany A
Shareholders’ equity Other assets 
Loan capital
Shareholders’ equity Other assets 
Loan capital
Adjusted shareholders’ equity : 100 Adjusted shareholders’ equity : 200
Moreover, the percentage of the investment allowance for 
small firms was reduced to zero  (1). This measure applies 
to both the one-off investment relief and the staggered 
allowance,  though  in  the  latter  case  there  is  provision 
for a transitional arrangement. The increased investment 
allowance, such as that for patents and R&D, nonetheless 
continues to apply.
At the same time, the tax credit system for SMEs was 
abolished. Previously, SMEs could claim a tax credit equiv-
alent to 7.5 p.c. of the increase in the capital paid up in 
cash (including share premiums), subject to a maximum 
of 19,850 euro.
The budgetary cost of the risk capital allowance should 
also  be  limited  by  the  anti-abuse  provisions  laid  down 
by the law, and by the fact that some companies cannot 
use this new tax allowance. Thus, SMEs which continue 
to apply the investment reserve regime are excluded from 
claiming  the  risk  capital  allowance  during  the  ensuing 
three years.
During  the  debate  in  the  Chamber  of  Representatives 
concerning  the  law  of  22  June  2005,  the  Minister  of 
Finance gave an estimate of the expected impact on the 
government  budget  (2).  The  decline  in  public  revenues 
attributable to the risk capital allowance was thus esti-
mated at 506 million euro, and that attributable to the 
abolition of the registration fee on contributions to com-
panies was put at 60 million euro. The amount raised by 
the compensatory measures and the expected payback 
effects should come to exactly the same amount, namely 
566 million euro. This tax reform was therefore assumed 
to be neutral in its effect on the government budget.
2.      Influence on the financial structure 
of companies
This section examines how the introduction of the risk 
capital allowance has affected the financing decisions of 
companies established in Belgium. It is in fact very much 
in their interests to review their equity and balance sheet 
position in order to optimise the potential impact of the 
risk capital allowance on their effective tax burden. This 
section first outlines some of the financial options available 
to companies. Next, it analyses the movement in equity 
capital. Finally, it investigates whether the stated aim of 
strengthening corporate solvency will be achieved.
2.1    Possible influence of corporate financial options
For companies, the choice between debt financing and 
equity financing depends not only on parameters specific 
to the business – its internal organisation, management 
method, size, profitability, growth prospects, etc. – but 
also on tax considerations. The introduction of the risk 
capital  allowance  has  therefore  brought  a  structural 
change in the financial behaviour of companies, as it is 
in  their  interests  to  modify  their  financing  structure  in 
order to make maximum use of the tax advantage which 
this measure offers them. Consequently, companies may 
be tempted to expand the basis for calculating the risk 
capital  allowance,  namely  their  adjusted  equity  capital, 
by increasing the amount of their capital or reducing the 
elements deducted from it.
The various techniques for optimising the financing struc-
ture are not all the same in their impact on Belgian public 
finances, as illustrated by the examples below.
The risk capital allowance attenuates the discrimination 
against equity as opposed to borrowings and reduces the 
relative cost of equity capital. As a result, a company may 
choose to substitute equity for borrowings or to finance 
new  investments  with  more  of  its  own  capital  rather 
(1)  However, investments in the production and recycling of reusable packaging may 
still qualify for the investment allowance.
(2)  Belgian chamber of representatives, 31 May 2005, Draft law introducing the 
risk capital allowance – report on behalf of the Commission for Finance and the 
Budget, presented by Mr Bart Tommelein.MacroeconoMic and fiscal iMpact of  
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than with loans. An example of a substitution movement 
between  borrowings  and  equity  financing  is  shown  in 
diagram 1. This is not normally accompanied by any loss 
of corporation tax revenues since the interest deductible 
against tax is replaced by a tax-  deductible percentage of 
the  new  equity  capital.  Since  companies  generally  pay 
a higher rate on their borrowings than the interest rate 
on linear bonds, this movement could even, in principle, 
generate higher corporation tax revenues.
Apart  from  the  phenomenon  of  substitution  between 
debt and equity financing, tax considerations may some-
times  make  it  more  advantageous  for  companies  to 
operate via subsidiaries as in the example in diagram 2  (1). 
In that case, the parent company retains all its financial 
resources  comprising  equity  and  borrowings  and  uses 
those  funds  to  capitalise  its  subsidiary.  In  view  of  its 
shareholding in the subsidiary, the parent company is not 
eligible for the risk capital allowance, but it may continue 
to deduct from its tax base the amount of the interest 
paid on the capital which it has borrowed. Conversely, the 
subsidiary can use the risk capital allowance for the whole 
of its equity capital.
It should be pointed out that in this specific example, the 
total amount on the basis of which the allowance can be 
used is higher than the amount of the parent company’s 
equity  capital.  In  such  arrangements,  the  risk  capital 
allowance is therefore partly converted to an additional 
deduction based on the group’s loan capital. Such optimi-
sation techniques only appear to strengthen the solvency 
of the group of companies and could entail substantial 
additional costs for the government budget.
The  formation  of  a  finance  company  within  a  group 
of companies may also be attractive in tax terms. Such 
finance companies are capitalised mainly by the parent 
company or by several companies belonging to a group. 
These companies provide finance for affiliated companies 
based in Belgium or abroad, and thus take on the role 
of the group’s “internal banker”. Finance companies are 
therefore  fairly  similar  to  coordination  centres  in  terms 
of their activity and financial structure. Thus, on expiry 
of their approval the coordination centres can adopt the 
form of a finance company. One characteristic of these 
companies is that they have very substantial equity and 
essentially  obtain  their  income  by  charging  interest  on 
the loans which they grant to other group companies. 
Consequently, their return on equity is on average fairly 
low and they succeed in reducing their effective tax rate to 
a very low level by means of the risk capital allowance.
On the basis of techniques designed to optimise the bal-
ance  sheet  structure  for  tax  purposes,  a  few  examples 
of  which  have  been  described,  a  considerable  increase 
in shareholders’ equity following the introduction of the 
risk  capital  allowance  could  a  priori  be  expected.  Also 
investments in associated companies could be expected to 
show a marked rise, primarily as a result of the formation 
of finance companies.
In reducing the effective rate of corporation tax, the tax 
reform could also cause more operators to pursue their 
activities in the form of a company. Their number could 















Shareholders’ equity Other assets 
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Assets Liabilities
Shareholders’ equity Other assets 
Parent company A
Subsidiary B
Adjusted shareholders’ equity : 300
Adjusted shareholders’ equity : 0
Adjusted shareholders’ equity  : 100
Share in company B
DIAGRAM 2  CREATION OF A SUBSIDIARY TO TAKE OVER THE MAIN ACTIVITIES
(1)  Such restructuring cannot take place purely for tax reasons ; economic 





















































CHART 3  CHANGES IN THE AUTHORISED CAPITAL OF 
COMPANIES
  (billions of euros)
Source : NBB.
(1)  The statistics on capital reductions have only been compiled since 2003.
a development could cause a shift away from taxes on 
earned incomes and towards corporation tax, resulting in 
lower revenues for the government.
2.2    Changes in the authorised capital
Since the risk capital allowance was introduced, there has 
been a noticeable rise in the authorised capital and hence 
in the shareholders’ capital of companies established in 
Belgium  (1).
In 2006, the net additional capital, namely the difference 
between the increase in capital due to the formation of 
companies or equity increases and the decline in capital 
due to equity reductions, came to 102 billion euro. Capital 
increases  were  more  than  double  the  figure  recorded 
during the economic boom at the turn of the millennium. 
Capital added via company formations also increased in 
2006. Conversely, there was hardly a change in equity 
reductions.
In  2007,  the  net  additional  capital  increased  again  to 
141 billion euro. A very sharp rise in the equity capital was 
again recorded in the first quarter of 2008, indicating that 
the dynamic effects generated by the introduction of the 
risk capital allowance are still perceptible.
The  breakdown  of  net  movements  in  the  authorised 
capital shows that capital contributions of both domes-
tic and foreign origin increased substantially to around 
50 billion euro each in 2006. In contrast, foreign capital 
contributions exceeded those of domestic origin in 2007.
Capital  contributions  of  Belgian  origin  were  financed 
mainly by non-financial corporations and financial insti-
tutions. That indicates that those companies are invest-
ing  more  in  other  companies  established  in  Belgium. 
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Loans
DIAGRAM 3  CREATION OF A FINANCE COMPANY
(1)  Since any amendments to the articles of association of a Belgian company 
have to be published in the Moniteur belge annexes, almost all changes in the 
authorised capital of companies may be found there, except for the variable 
capital of cooperative societies.MacroeconoMic and fiscal iMpact of  
the risk capital allowance
15
2.3    Change in shareholders’ equity
The change in the shareholders’ equity is influenced not 
only by fluctuations in the authorised capital but also by 
movements concerning the reserves or the profit or loss 
carried forward. In 2006 there was very sustained growth 
– in the order of 105 billion euro – in the equity capital of 
Belgian companies other than the coordination centres  (2).
The increase in the equity capital concerned both SMEs 
and  large  corporations,  credit  institutions  and  insur-
ance companies. However, the most sustained increase 
– namely 67 billion euro between 2005 and 2006 – was 
recorded  in  the  equity  capital  of  finance  companies 
which file their annual accounts with the Central Balance 
Sheet Office : these are mainly financial holding compa-
nies, finance companies, investment companies and the 
financial centres of large business groups. This category 
comprises a number of new companies and the compa-
nies which perform the role of finance centres for multi-
national groups.











Net additional capital  .................................... 40 13 102 141
  of which : inﬂuence of the coordination centres   .......... 22 1 1 13
Domestic origin  ......................................... 3 2 48 56
  of which : inﬂuence of the coordination centres   .......... 0 –2 4 3
Non-ﬁnancial corporations  .............................. 4 0 24 14
Financial institutions  ................................... 0 1 19 34
Households  ........................................... 1 1 4 7
Other  ................................................ –2 0 1 1
Foreign origin  ........................................... 36 10 51 75
  of which : inﬂuence of the coordination centres   .......... 22 3 –3 10
Indeterminate origin  ..................................... 1 0 3 10
Source : NBB.
(1)  The data on capital increases and reductions were adjusted for transactions which have no impact on the basis for calculating the risk capital allowance, such as the 
incorporation of reserves in the authorised capital.
 
(1)  The increase in capital originating from households may also be due in part to the 
fact that self-employed persons are now pursuing their activities in the form of a 
company.
(2)  Changes in the situation concerning the shareholders’ equity of companies can 
be monitored on the basis of the non-consolidated annual accounts filed with 
the Central Balance Sheet Office, the scheme A accounts of credit institutions 
and the balance sheet data forwarded to the CBFA by insurance companies. 
The figures may differ from those relating to changes in the authorised capital, 
notably on account of the change in the allocation of the profits and losses, but 
also because of time lags between the date of establishment and capital increases 
and the first occasion on which annual accounts are filed.
lead to an increase in shareholders’ capital. Conversely, 
the capital contribution resulting from capital invested by 
households resulted in an increase in the equity capital of 
Belgian companies at consolidated level  (1).
The  considerable  contribution  of  capital  from  other 
countries led to a rise in the authorised capital of Belgian 
companies while strengthening their financial autonomy, 
at least at Belgian level. These capital inflows partly reflect 
a move to substitute capital injections for current loans 
granted by foreign companies. In addition, the risk capital 
allowance has done much to encourage the formation 
of finance companies, allowing a large proportion of the 
authorised capital to flow back out to other countries in 
the form of loans.
The record capital contributions from abroad recorded in 
2006, and particularly in 2007, seem to indicate that the 
risk capital allowance has succeeded in making Belgium 
attractive from the tax angle. It is unclear exactly how 
these  inflows  will  affect  the  Belgian  economy,  but  in 
principle they do not entail any budgetary costs for the 
government. Since they may lead to changes in the alloca-
tion of the profits of international groups and cause the 
tax base or other components of taxation to shift towards 
Belgium, it is even possible that they may have a positive 
effect  on  corporation  tax  revenues  in  Belgium.  On  the 
other hand, the capital flows and the associated shifts in 
the various components of taxation could depress govern-
ment revenues in other countries.16
TABLE  3  MOVEMENT IN OUTSTANDING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT














Belgian foreign investment  ................ 223 234 258 282 326 322
Equity capital  .............................. 112 114 135 158 165 140
Investments in the authorised capital  (1)  ...... 91 96 104 115 125 111
Revaluation gains, reserves and proﬁts/losses 
carried forward   ........................... 21 18 31 43 39 29
Interﬁrm loans  ............................. 111 120 123 124 161 182
Foreign investment in Belgium  ............. 242 251 269 292 320 361
Equity capital  .............................. 192 193 205 220 247 287
Investments in the authorised capital  (1)  ...... 152 169 173 184 192 214
Revaluation gains, reserves and proﬁts/losses 
carried forward   ........................... 40 24 32 37 55 73
Interﬁrm loans  ............................. 51 57 64 72 73 75
Source : NBB.
(1)  Including share premiums.
 
Not only did companies other than SMEs record sustained 
growth of their equity in 2006, their investments in associ-
ated companies also grew strongly, by 53 billion euro  (1). 
The data on the increase in the authorised capital show 
that these investments were largely acquired in Belgian 
companies.
2.4    Movement in foreign direct investment
The  movement  in  foreign  direct  investment,  for  which 
the latest figures relate to the year 2006, seems to con-
firm the findings based on the changes in the authorised 
capital  (2).

















Non-ﬁnancial corporations  ................................ 230 255 286 25 31
Large corporations  ..................................... 173 193 215 20 22
SMEs  ................................................ 58 63 72 5 9
Finance companies ﬁling their annual accounts with the Central 
Balance Sheet Ofﬁce  ..................................... 207 225 292 18 67
Credit institutions and insurance companies  ................. 44 43 49 –1 7
Total  .................................................. 481 523 628 42 105
Sources : CBFA, NBB.
(1)  Excluding the equity capital of the coordination centres.
 
(1)  The figures on investments in associated companies are not available for SMEs.
(2)  Foreign direct investment was assessed mainly on the basis of the results of the 
annual direct investment survey conducted by the Bank since 1997. That survey 
considers the outstanding amount of the inward and outward foreign direct 
investment of a population of resident firms which, though not totally exhaustive, 
is comparable over time. The firms taken into account in the survey are selected 
on the basis of accounting criteria, and it is possible to take account of both 
direct and indirect shareholdings between companies in the same group. It is 
also possible to consider the foreign capital contributions of each company in 
relation to their use in terms of foreign direct investment and thus to measure the 
importance of the financial interchange role performed by certain multinational 
group companies.MacroeconoMic and fiscal iMpact of  
the risk capital allowance
17
According to the annual survey results, the outstanding 
amount of Belgium’s foreign direct investment contracted 
by 4 billion euro in 2006, to 322 billion. This decline was 
attributable largely to a relatively small number of firms. 
The total net authorised capital held by Belgian companies 
in the rest of the world was down by 25 billion euro, while 
foreign loans granted by Belgian companies increased by 
20 billion euro.
Foreign direct investment in Belgium was up from 320 bil-
lion euro in 2005 to 361 billion in 2006, an increase of 
41 billion. Virtually all these contributions of funds to resi-
dent companies took the form of authorised capital ; this 
concerned almost exclusively the strengthening of existing 
foreign direct investment links.
In 2006, Belgian companies largely preserved their tradi-
tional role of intermediary in the financial transactions of 
multinational companies, although the pattern of inward 
foreign  direct  investment  deviated  somewhat  from  the 
usual profile. A particular feature seen this year was the 
greater involvement of companies other than the coordi-
nation centres in foreign direct investment flows.
In  2006,  some  of  these  finance  companies  other  than 
coordination centres obtained new foreign capital con-
tributions,  totalling  113  billion  euro.  They  used  these 
financial resources primarily to grant loans to foreign firms 
amounting to 65 billion euro. Thus, whereas they used 
to reinvest these funds most frequently in the form of 
equity capital, their transactions are now similar to those 
of the coordination centres. At the same time, they have 
retained in Belgium a larger percentage of the incoming 
investment than in the past, namely 45 billion euro.
Other  Belgian  firms  recorded  in  2006  a  decline  in  the 
amount of their capital owned by foreign shareholders, 
or they repaid loans which they had been granted. This 
caused a reduction of 53 billion euro in foreign assets 
invested  in  these  firms,  half  of  which  was  offset  by 
TABLE  4  CAPITAL MOVEMENTS IN BELGIAN AFFILIATES OF FOREIGN COMPANIES, EXCLUDING COORDINATION CENTRES














1. F oreign capital contributions to resident 
ﬁrms  .................................. 52 35 38 42 41 113
1.1  Funds reinvested abroad by the ﬁrms 
concerned  .......................... 19 17 19 22 10 68
In the form of equity capital  ......... 17 12 16 17 3 3
In the form of interﬁrm loans  ........ 2 5 3 4 6 65
1.2  Foreign capital contributions remaining in 
Belgium  ............................ 32 18 19 20 32 45
2. F oreign capital withdrawals from resident 
ﬁrms  .................................. 23 40 29 21 25 53
2.1  Disinvestment of foreign funds by the 
ﬁrms concerned  ..................... –1 12 2 3 –1 26
In the form of equity capital  ......... –1 9 –3 2 –2 20
In the form of interﬁrm loans  ........ 0 3 4 1 1 6
2.2  Foreign capital withdrawals not offset by 
foreign disinvestments  ................ 23 28 27 18 26 27
Change in inward foreign direct investment 
(1 – 2)  .................................... 29 –6 9 21 16 60
Net foreign investment by the ﬁrms concerned 
(1.1 – 2.1)  ................................. 20 5 17 18 11 42
Actual capital increase (+) or reduction (–) in the 
ﬁrms concerned 
(1.2 – 2.2)  ................................. 9 –11 –8 2 5 18
Source : NBB.








































CHART 4  DEGREE OF FINANCIAL AUTONOMY (1)
  (percentages, end-of-year data)
Source : NBB.
(1)  The degree of financial autonomy is defined as the percentage of the equity 





the recovery of assets which they themselves had held 
abroad.
In net terms, the increase in inward foreign direct invest-
ment in firms other than coordination centres came to 
60 billion euro in 2006. Taking account of the foreign 
direct investment effected by these firms themselves, their 
financial  resources  thus  increased  by  18  billion  euro  in 
2006, compared to 5 billion in 2005. As is often the case, 
this overall picture is dominated by a few firms effecting 
very large transactions.
The coordination centres also received a large net inflow 
of capital, amounting to 44 billion euro in 2006, com-
pared to a reduction of 19 billion in 2005 (cf. the table in 
Annex 3). This is attributable mainly to the repayment of 
interfirm loans to one of these centres, while there was 
a  substantial  fall  in  the  foreign  investment  which  they 
received.
The evident concentration of funds invested in the form 
of equity capital in Belgium and the increase in loans to 
foreign firms are both in line with the pattern expected 
following entry into force of the system of the risk capital 
allowance. The financial arrangements previously set up 
via coordination centres now seem to have been trans-
ferred to other finance companies.
2.5    Newly formed finance companies
Around 5,350 new finance companies filing their annual 
accounts with the Central Balance Sheet Office were reg-
istered in 2005 and 2006. Altogether, the equity capital 
issued by these new companies grew by around 42 billion 
euro, compared to an expansion of 85 billion for finance 
companies as a whole. These new finance companies are 
very diverse. The 14 largest ones on their own account for 
an increase in equity capital in the order of 32 billion euro. 
The authorised capital of these companies mainly comes 
from abroad : the finance centres of a few large multina-
tional groups have been set up in Belgium, and groups 
of Belgian firms have repatriated funds from abroad. On 
the basis of the annual accounts for 2006, the profits and 
taxes reported by these companies, the implicit tax rate 
for these companies can be estimated at around 4 p.c.
2.6    Solvency
The non-consolidated data of the Central Balance Sheet 
Office indicate that non-financial corporations established 
in Belgium have already for some time been recording 
an increase in the share of the equity capital in the total 
liabilities. This trend towards greater financial autonomy 
clearly intensified in 2005 and 2006, possibly indicating 
an improvement in the solvency of Belgian companies.
However,  this  finding  calls  for  certain  reservations.  As 
already mentioned, a large proportion of the increase in 
equity capital is due to shareholdings acquired by other 
associated firms. This traditional measure of the solvency 
of companies in general could therefore present a biased 
picture  of  the  actual  improvement  in  the  solvency  of 
Belgian firms  (1).
However, it seems that in 2006 the rise in the loan capital 
of non-financial corporations filing their annual accounts 
with the Central Balance Sheet Office did slow down in 
both absolute and relative terms, falling to its lowest level 
for ten years, whereas during other boom periods there 
had been a sustained expansion in loans. This appears to 
indicate that firms have made relatively less use of debt 
financing.  One  possible  explanation  lies  in  the  replace-
ment  of  current  foreign  loans  with  investments  in  the 
authorised capital. However, the slower expansion of loan 
capital was evident mainly in the case of SMEs, where 
it is reasonable to suppose that foreign investments are 
(1)  It would be preferable to determine the solvency of Belgian companies on the 
basis of consolidated balance sheet data, but such information is not available.MacroeconoMic and fiscal iMpact of  
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relatively less significant. These factors suggest that the 
risk capital allowance has led to a strengthening of the 
solvency of non-financial corporations.
3.    An alternative to the coordination 
centres ?
This section looks at the Belgian fiscal regime applicable 
to coordination centres, as the introduction of the risk 
capital allowance was also intended to offer an alternative 
to  these  centres.  Thus,  it  briefly  explains  the  coordina-
tion  centre  regime  before  describing  the  developments 
concerning the number of these centres and their capital 
transactions. Finally, it reviews employment in the coordi-
nation centres and in the new finance centres.
3.1    The coordination centre tax regime
The Belgian rules on coordination centres apply to compa-
nies which take on the management of the financial flows 
of other companies belonging to a multinational group  (1).
The advantageous tax rules for coordination centres were 
introduced in 1982. During the debates which began in 
the late 1990s concerning tax regimes which could distort 
competition, the Ecofin Council finally decided that this 
regime was a harmful tax measure implying a form of 
unfair competition, so that it had to be abolished. The 
abolition of this regime also resulted from the European 
Commission’s decision, in 2003, that it was incompatible 
with the current rules on State aid. The regime is to be 
phased out altogether by the end of 2010.
The tax concession enjoyed by coordination centres was 
estimated at just under 1.9 billion euro for the 2004 tax 
year  (2).  The  economic  impact  of  these  centres  on  the 
Belgian economy and the real influence of the tax conces-
sion on Belgian public finances are very difficult to assess, 
and  are  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study.  The  activities 
pursued  by  the  coordination  centres  are  in  fact  highly 
mobile, and most of them probably would not have been 
located in Belgium in the absence of these advantageous 
tax rules.
One  of  the  aims  of  introducing  the  risk  capital  allow-
ance  was  to  enable  Belgium  to  offer  an  alternative  to 
the coordination centres at a time when they were losing 
or relinquishing their approval. This alternative obviously 
had to be acceptable in a European context. On expiry 
or relinquishment of their approval, coordination centres 
come within the scope of the ordinary rules on corporate 
taxation,  and  can  therefore  use  the  risk  capital  allow-
ance. Coordination centres are notable for the substantial 
equity capital at their disposal – in the order of 170 billion 
euro in 2006, taking all coordination centres together – 
and  for  the  relatively  low  return  which  they  generally 
obtain on that equity. Coordination centres obtain their 
main revenue from charging interest on loans to other 
group  companies.  These  various  factors  mean  that  the 
risk capital allowance may offer a good alternative to the 
coordination centres.
3.2    Change in the number of coordination centres
The FPS Finance has a list of coordination centres which 
have  been  granted  official  approval,  for  some  specific 
points in time. It is not possible to state with certainty 
that a coordination centre approved by the tax authority is 
actually active and does not complete an ordinary corpo-





































CHART 5 L OAN CAPITAL OF NON-FINANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS





(1)  To qualify for coordination centre approval, the company must belong to a 
multinational group with consolidated capital of at least 24 million euro and a 
consolidated annual turnover of at least 240 million euro. The foreign equity 
must total at least 12 million euro or 20 p.c. of the group’s consolidated foreign 
equity capital. After two years, the coordination centre must employ at least ten 
full-time workers.
(2)  Belgian Chamber of Representatives, State revenue and resources budget for the 
2006 fiscal year – Annex : 2005 list of exemptions, abatements and reductions 
influencing the State revenues.
(3)  On the basis of a comparison of the tax returns relating to the 2006 and 2007 
tax years, it seems that a number of coordination centres which had applied for 
exemption of their profits under the coordination centre system in 2006 opted 
to replace this preferential tax regime by applying the risk capital allowance for 
the 2007 tax year. This may indicate the attractions of the risk capital allowance 














































CHART 6  CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF COORDINATION 
CENTRES (1)
Sources : FPS Finance, NBB.
(1)  Estimate based on the special tax that coordination centres have to pay on their 
employees. For 2008, this concerns the number of coordination centres holding 
FPS Finance approval in March of that year.















CHART 7  NET CHANGES IN THE AUTHORISED CAPITAL OF 
COORDINATION CENTRES STILL APPROVED IN 
2004 (1)
  (millions of euros)
Source : NBB.
(1)  Difference between increases and reductions in the authorised capital, making a 
distinction between capital transactions according to whether their destination or 
origin is domestic or foreign. 
Domestic destination or origin
Foreign destination or origin
Total
the annual change in the number of active coordination 
centres on the basis of the special tax which these centres 
have to pay on their first ten employees.
The number of coordination centres approved and active 
had already declined somewhat during the 1990s and at 
the start of this decade. The figure had in fact dropped 
from  just  over  250  in  1993  to  around  200  in  2005. 
However, this downward trend has become much more 
marked since 2005. It is attributable mainly to the restric-
tions  imposed  by  the  European  Commission  on  the 
renewal of coordination centre approvals.
It  is  also  evident  from  the  detailed  FPS  Finance  data 
that  the  number  of  approved  coordination  centres  has 
slumped  in  the  past  few  years,  dropping  from  226  in 
2004  to  146  in  November  2007.  Since  the  European 
Commission decision of 13 November 2007 restricted the 
transitional measures, a number of coordination centres 
lost their approval at the end of 2007. According to the 
latest figures, around 74 coordination centres were still 
active in March 2008.
For the purposes of the analysis below, the coordination 
centres  are  divided  into  different  groups  according  to 
whether they still possess approval or, if that is no longer 
the  case,  according  to  the  date  on  which  they  lost  it. 
A further distinction is made between the centres which 
have been wound up and those which are still active in a 
different form.
3.3    Capital transactions by coordination centres
On the basis of the list of coordination centres approved 
in 2004 by FPS Finance, the capital transactions effected 
by these centres were examined ; for that purpose, a dis-
tinction was made according to whether the counterparty 
was based in Belgium or abroad  (1). The detailed figures 
are set out in Annex 4. Identification of the counterparty 
is important not only to determine the percentage of the 
capital remaining in Belgium, but also to assess the budg-
etary cost of the risk capital allowance. If, on liquidation 
of a coordination centre or a substantial reduction in its 
capital, the capital is transferred to another Belgian com-
pany in the group, that increases the basis for calculation 
of the risk capital allowance, in contrast to a situation in 
which the capital is injected into foreign companies.
It is important to note that the marked fall in the number 
of approved coordination centres has not so far led to 
any substantial net outflows of capital from coordination 
centres approved in 2004. Indeed, a net capital increase 
(1)  If, at the time of a capital transaction effected by a coordination centre, an 
identical capital transaction in the opposite direction is effected simultaneously 
by a Belgian partner of the multinational group, the counterparty which was 
previously a foreign partner becomes a Belgian partner.MacroeconoMic and fiscal iMpact of  
the risk capital allowance
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of 30 billion euro was recorded in the period 2004-2007. 
Only  in  2005  was  there  a  small,  net  reduction  in  the 
authorised  capital.  Moreover,  leaving  aside  2006,  the 
increase in the authorised capital is attributable mainly to 
inflows of foreign capital.
It is possible to divide the capital transactions between 
coordination centres which were still approved in March 
2008 and those which had already lost their approval.
In 2004 and 2005, coordination centres which had been 
approved  by  the  tax  authorities  and  had  lost  or  relin-
quished that approval between 2004 and November 2007 
recorded  substantial  outflows  of  capital  amounting  to 
24 billion euro, mainly as a result of liquidation. While the 
recorded counterparty was a foreign partner for half of 
the capital outflows in 2004, the bulk of those outflows 
went to Belgian companies in 2005. Since 2006, however, 
capital outflows from coordination centres which are still 
active  have  ceased,  and  there  has  actually  been  a  net 
increase in the authorised capital.
The coordination centres whose approval expired recently 
– between November 2007 and March 2008 – did not 
record  any  marked  change  in  their  authorised  capi-
tal  during  the  period  2004-2007.  Three  centres  have 
increased  their  capital  since  losing  their  approval,  and 
five others have reduced their capital. These transactions 
generated substantial net inflows of foreign capital during 
this brief period, and more particularly in the first three 
months of 2008.
The  coordination  centres  which  had  not  yet  lost  their 
approval in March 2008 recorded a considerable increase 
in their capital between 2004 and 2007.
Approved  coordination  centres  do  not  form  a  homog-
enous group ; the bulk of the capital is concentrated in 
just a few dozen centres. The data on the equity position 
show  that  the  coordination  centres  which  recently  lost 
their approval and those which are still approved are the 
main ones that still have relatively substantial equity capi-
tal. In 2006, these two groups each had equity totalling 
around 70 billion euro. Any analysis of the impact of the 
risk capital allowance on capital transactions effected by 
coordination centres is therefore very provisional.
Between 2004 and 2008, a number of coordination cen-
tres terminated their activities in Belgium and their capital 
was  transferred  abroad,  even  after  the  introduction  of 
the risk capital allowance. However, whereas in 2004 the 
coordination centres which had lost their approval were 
often in liquidation and had distributed their authorised 
capital among their various – largely foreign – sharehold-
ers, the trend now seems to have been reversed, since no 
further substantial capital outflows have been recorded. 













CHART 8  NET CHANGES IN THE AUTHORISED CAPITAL OF COORDINATION CENTRES STILL APPROVED IN 2004 ACCORDING TO THEIR 
RECENT STATUS (1)
  (millions of euros)
Source : NBB.
(1)  Difference between increases and reductions in the authorised capital, making a distinction between capital transactions according to whether their destination or origin is 
domestic or foreign.
Foreign destination or origin
Domestic destination or origin
APPROVAL EXPIRED BETWEEN 
NOVEMBER 2007 AND MARCH 2008 APPROVAL STILL VALID
APPROVAL EXPIRED BEFORE 
NOVEMBER 200722
TABLE  5  EMPLOYMENT IN THE COORDINATION CENTRES STILL APPROVED IN 2004
(number of persons, situation at end of year)
 
p.m.  











Total  ..................................... 226 9,510 9,419 9,411 8,616
Approval expired between 2004 and September 
2006  ..................................... 44 986 796 551 536
Liquidated or not active in 2006  ............ 30 595 386 151 0
Active in 2006  ........................... 14 391 410 400 536
Approval expired between September 2006 and 
November 2007  ............................ 36 1,171 1,192 1,201 559
Liquidated or not active in 2006  ............ 14 593 580 574 0
Active in 2006  ........................... 22 578 612 627 559
Approval expired between November 2007 and 
March 2008  ............................... 72 4,066 3,886 4,002 3,711
Approval still valid in March 2008  ............ 74 3,287 3,545 3,657 3,810
Sources : FPS Finance, NBB.
 
The absence of significant capital outflows from the coor-
dination centres during the second half of 2007 and the 
beginning of 2008 seems to be a sign that many coordi-
nation centres regarded the risk capital allowance as an 
acceptable alternative.
3.4    Employment in the coordination centres
The data obtained from the social balance sheets show 
that,  in  the  coordination  centres  approved  in  2004, 
employment dropped from 9,510 persons at the end of 
2003 to 8,616 persons at the end of 2006, a decline of 
around 900 persons.
This  decline  is  due  mainly  to  the  coordination  centres 
whose  approval  expired  and  which  were  liquidated  or 
ceased operating during this period. At the end of 2004, 
employment in these coordination centres still amounted 
to around 1,200 persons. Those jobs were not necessar-
ily lost to the Belgian economy since the workers were 
transferred  to  other  group  companies  in  a  number  of 
important cases.
Employment in the coordination centres whose approval 
had expired in March 2008 but which were still active in 
2006 declined by around 200 persons between the end 
of 2003 and 2006. Conversely, in the coordination cen-
tres whose approval had not yet expired in March 2008, 
employment expanded by around 500 persons.
If Belgium can attract new finance centres belonging to 
multinational  groups,  that  could  stimulate  employment 
and offset the job losses in coordination centres whose 
capital  and  activities  have  been  transferred  abroad.  At 
first sight, these new finance centres employ few people 
at the moment.
4.    Impact on investment and 
employment, and macroeconomic 
payback effects
The  potential  impact  of  the  risk  capital  allowance  on 
the Belgian economy is assessed by means of the Bank’s 
quarterly  “Noname”  model.  As  in  most  models,  this 
assessment is conducted by considering that the effects 
of corporate taxation on company decisions will be felt 
via the change in the user cost of capital. However, mac-
roeconomic models – which largely ignore the effects of 
distortionary taxes, particularly in regard to the location of 
economic activities – cannot readily be used to simulate 
measures modifying the tax system. For example, it is not 
possible to quantify how such a measure in favour of the 
results of decision centres and coordination centres will 
affect the maintenance or expansion of their activities in 
Belgium.
In the long term, corporate investment demand depends 
on output and the ratio between the capital cost and the 
production price. In the short term, these investments are MacroeconoMic and fiscal iMpact of  
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also influenced by an additional accelerator effect gener-
ated by cash flows. The risk capital allowance was intro-
duced in the model simulation in two stages. First, via a 
reduction in the user cost of capital, on the basic assump-
tion that this tax measure would be neutral ex ante for 
the general government budget. In a second phase, an 
increase in corporate cash flows was also introduced. To 
assess  the  measure’s  ex  ante  effect  on  corporate  cash 
flows, it is necessary to know its budgetary cost, or more 
precisely a transfer of resources from the government to 
the  business  sector.  This  cost  is  particularly  difficult  to 
assess,  since  the  measure  does  not  relate  only  to  new 
investments by firms, but concerns their entire balance 
sheet. That assessment therefore entails accounting and 
tax definitions which are beyond the scope of the model. 
In addition, the risk capital allowance is accompanied by a 
set of compensatory measures concerning corporate taxa-
tion, the impact of which is difficult to assess by means of 
a macroeconomic model. This second simulation is based 
on the assumption that, as a result of this tax measure, 
firms will pay, ex ante, one billion euro less each year by 
way of corporation tax ; that corresponds to a reduction 
in  government  revenues  totalling  0.3  p.c.  of  GDP.  The 
effects of any measures designed to offset the impact on 
the government budget of this reduction in revenues are 
disregarded.
The results of the simulation of the reduction in the cost 
of capital with no ex ante budgetary cost are presented 
first. Long-term investment demand reacts to both output 
and the user cost of capital. The reduction in the cost 
of capital stimulates investment demand which in turn 
boosts domestic demand and demand for imports. The 
strengthening of domestic demand is reflected in higher 
employment  and  lower  unemployment.  If  the  ex  ante 
budgetary cost of the measure is zero, corporate invest-
ments increase by a maximum of 420 million euro, and 
employment  expands  by  around  3,200  units.  Such  a 
measure modifying the tax system that is related to invest-
ment funding has practically no effect on prices. More 
detailed results are presented in Annex 5.
The  second  simulation  incorporates  the  effects  of  a 
reduction in corporation tax totalling one billion euro per 
annum. If the measure reduces total corporate taxes, that 
boosts the cash flows available to firms. These additional 
cash flows generate higher investment, on top of that 
resulting  from  the  substitution  of  capital  for  labour  in 
TABLE  6  EFFECTS OF THE REDUCTION IN THE COST OF CAPITAL  (1) IN A SCENARIO OF EX ANTE BUDGET NEUTRALITY












Investments  ................................ 80 330 420 420 420
Employment (units, end of period)  ............ 200 1,400 2,400 2,900 3,200
Primary budget balance  ..................... 10 60 110 110 100
Source : NBB.
(1)  Excluding effects of any compensatory measures on the cost of capital.
 
TABLE  7  EFFECTS OF THE REDUCTION IN THE COST OF CAPITAL  (1) ACCOMPANIED BY AN EX ANTE BUDGETARY COST OF  
ONE BILLION EURO PER ANNUM












Investments  ................................ 130 600 850 900 900
Employment (units, end of period)  ............ 300 2,400 4,700 6,000 6,700
Primary budget balance  ..................... –990 –900 –790 –760 –770
Source : NBB.
















































CHART 9  CORPORATION TAX REVENUES
  (percentages of GDP)
Sources : NAI, NBB.
Introduction of 
the risk capital allowance
response to the reduction in the cost of capital. This cash-
flow effect is greater the higher the ex ante budgetary 
cost, and hence the impact on cash flows. For an ex ante 
budgetary cost of one billion euro, the effect on corporate 
investment  would  be  900  million  euro  maximum,  and 
the impact on employment would come to 6,700 units. 
Apart from a very small increase in personal income tax 
and social contributions resulting from job creation, the 
payback effects on public finances are relatively minor.
On the basis of individual data obtained from the social 
balance sheets, a multivariate analysis was also conducted 
on the employment growth rate between 2005 and 2006, 
taking account of the risk capital allowance, the industry 
and the company’s size and age. The risk capital allow-
ance seems to have a positive but marginal impact on 
employment  (1). There is no point at present in conducting 
a specific analysis on the effects of the introduction of 
the risk capital allowance on employment by industry, in 
view of the very limited macroeconomic effect on employ-
ment in the first year following the introduction of such 
a measure.
Since  the  measure  took  effect  in  2006,  what  is  being 
assessed is the measure’s spin-off effect on employment. 
However, it takes time for firms to adjust their employ-
ment, so that it is not surprising that the effect measured 
is marginal. These results are in line with those obtained at 
macroeconomic level by the model, which indicated that 
the measure would have weak effects on employment in 
the first year.
5.    Implications for the government 
budget
The  budgetary  implications  of  the  risk  capital  allow-
ance and the other measures provided for by the law of 
22  June 2005 are not easy to assess. In fact, it is essential 
to distinguish between the gross tax advantage which the 
tax  allowance  represents  for  companies,  which  can  be 
calculated on the basis of the adjusted equity capital as 
reported on the corporation tax return forms, and the real 
impact of this measure on Belgian government revenues.
This  section  begins  by  examining  the  budgetary  impli-
cations  of  this  corporate  income  tax  reform  from  a 
macroeconomic perspective. That approach provides an 
indication of the reform’s impact on public finances. There 
follows a detailed analysis based on microeconomic data 
which, on the basis of the gross tax advantage enjoyed 
by companies since the introduction of the risk capital 
allowance, proceeds to examine the reform’s net impact 
on the government budget. Finally, this section discusses 
the potential future influence of various dynamic effects 
of the reform on public finances.
5.1    Macroeconomic analysis of the tax on 
corporations
The taxes levied on corporate profits totalled 3.7 p.c. of 
GDP in 2007, corresponding to around 7.5 p.c. of total 
public revenues. Corporation tax therefore exceeded by 
0.3 p.c. of GDP the level which it had reached in 2005, 
the  year  preceding  the  introduction  of  the  risk  capital 
allowance. In comparison with 2003, revenues increased 
by  no  less  than  0.8  p.c.  of  GDP,  or  almost  a  quarter. 
Consequently, both the corporation tax revenues and their 
share in total revenues are at a historically high level.
The  movement  in  corporation  tax  as  a  percentage  of 
GDP can be divided into two components, namely the 
movement in the tax base for the corporation tax and the 
movement in the implicit tax rate.
The gross or net operating results of the companies plus 
the net rents, the net property incomes imputed to insur-
ance policy holders and the net interest received, constitute 
a macroeconomic indicator which, overall, moves in line 
with the tax base  (2).This macroeconomic approximation of 
the tax base has grown steadily since 2001 in relation to 
GDP, except for a minor dip in 2007.
(1)  In this microeconomic analysis, the risk capital allowance could also partially 
capture the effect on employment of the firm’s profitability or improved solvency.
(2)  The tax definition of depreciation differs significantly from that used in the 
national accounts. That is why the implicit rates calculated on the basis of both 
the net and the gross operating results are mentioned here.MacroeconoMic and fiscal iMpact of  
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The introduction of the risk capital allowance may have 
affected  both  the  implicit  tax  rate  and  the  tax  base. 
Although it is impossible to isolate the effect of the intro-
duction of this measure on corporate operating results, 
simulations based on the Bank’s econometric model show 
that the impact of the reform is probably relatively small. 
The increase in the authorised capital and the development 
of finance company activities – a phenomenon which the 
econometric model cannot simulate – could drive up net 
interest income. Such an increase was recorded in 2006, 
and at that time it exerted upward pressure on the esti-
mated tax base as a percentage of GDP.
Calculated on the basis of the corporate gross operating 
results,  the  macroeconomic  implicit  rate  of  corporation 
tax increased from 14.4 p.c. in 2005 to 14.7 p.c. in 2006, 
rising to 14.8 p.c. in 2007. The implicit tax rate calculated 
on the basis of the net operating results remained steady 
in 2006, at 25.5 p.c., before rising to 25.7 p.c. in 2007  (1).
These implicit tax rates are sensitive to the economic cycle 
and  generally  increase  when  the  economic  context  is 
favourable, as was the case in 2006 and 2007  (2). In other 
respects, it is very likely that the introduction of the risk 
capital allowance will exert a downward influence on the 
implicit tax rate owing to the expansion of the finance 
companies’ activities, and hence their tax bases, as these 
companies gain a relatively greater advantage from the 
tax allowance and therefore pay less tax.
Overall,  the  movement  in  the  macroeconomic  implicit 
rates  of  corporation  tax  suggests  that  the  introduction 
of the risk capital allowance had no significant negative 
effect on government revenues in 2006 and 2007.
The data on the movement in corporation tax during the 
initial months of 2008 also imply that the introduction of 
the risk capital allowance has not so far influenced public 
revenues. In fact, advance payments made by corpora-
tions on the first due date in April 2008 were 16.8 p.c. 
higher than those of the previous year.
(1)  The average implicit tax rate for non-financial corporations, calculated on the 
basis of their annual accounts, is less sensitive to the business cycle than the 
macroeconomic implicit tax rate since it is possible to identify the companies 
which are making a profit. That rate of tax had also risen slightly in 2006.
(2)  The macroeconomic corporate operating result corresponds to the sum of the 
positive and negative operating results of the companies. In an economic boom, 
the proportion of the positive operating result which is subject to tax tends to 
increase, while the proportion of the negative operating result on which no tax is 














































the risk capital allowance
Implicit rate calculated on the basis of 
the gross operating result
Implicit rate calculated on the basis of 
the net operating result
CHART 10  MACROECONOMIC IMPLICIT RATES OF 
CORPORATION TAX (1)
  (percentages)
Sources : NAI, NBB.
(1)  The tax assessments were brought backward by one year so that they roughly 
coincide with the advance payments relating to the same tax year. In addition, the 
revenue figures were adjusted for one-off factors which had inflated revenues in 
2006 and 2007. In 2006, the speedier collection of the assessments had boosted 
these revenues by around 900 million euro. In 2007, the one-off receipts 
generated by the measure permitting tax-exempt reserves to be paid out or 
























































CHART 11  ADVANCE PAYMENTS OF CORPORATION TAX
  (percentage changes compared to the previous year)
Sources : FPS Finance, NAI, NBB.
On the basis of 
the first due date.26












Non-ﬁnancial corporations  (3)   ............................... 1,012 1,290 1,633 +620
Large corporations  ..................................... 528 749 988 +460
SMEs  ................................................ 485 541 644 +159
Finance companies ﬁling their annual accounts with the Central 
Balance Sheet Ofﬁce  ..................................... 215 374 792 +577
Credit institutions and insurance companies  ................. 151 163 197 +46
Coordination centres applying the risk capital allowance  (4)   ..... – – 442 +442
Total  .................................................. 1,365 1,805 3,035 +1,670
Sources : CBFA, FPS Finance, NBB.
(1)  The data were based on the ﬁnancial position of the companies at the end of the ﬁnancial year.
(2)  For 2004 and 2005, this is the theoretical gross tax advantage for companies, since the risk capital allowance had not yet entered into effect at that time.
(3)  Excluding ﬁnance companies ﬁling their annual accounts with the Central Balance Sheet Ofﬁce.
(4)  On the basis of the available data it is not possible to ascertain the theoretical advantage which these coordination centres would have enjoyed in 2004 and 2005.
 
5.2    Gross tax advantage for corporations calculated 
on the basis of the annual accounts
An approximation of the gross tax advantage offered by 
the risk capital allowance can be derived on the basis of 
the  Central  Balance  Sheet  Office  data  relating  to  non-
financial corporations, the “scheme A” accounts of credit 
institutions and the information on insurance companies 
obtained from the CBFA. However, it is not possible to 
arrive at an exact figure on the basis of this information. 
Such  an  approach  tends  to  overestimate  the  gross  tax 
advantage for companies, as the annual accounts con-
tain no information on the accounting value of foreign 
branches, “villa” companies or SMEs applying the invest-
ment reserve rules, so that no adjustment can be made 
for  these  factors.  Moreover,  a  number  of  adjustments 
are made on the basis of the only data available, namely 
the accounting data, whereas the real adjustments are 
effected via the tax value. The figures are also calculated 
on the basis of the company’s financial position at the 
end  of  the  tax  year,  whereas  changes  in  the  adjusted 
equity capital are only taken into account pro rata tem-
poris  in  the  tax  return  form.  This  factor  could  have  a 
significant impact in years when strong capital increases 
are recorded.
In addition, the tax returns indicate that companies which 
applied for exemption of their profits under the rules on 
coordination centres for the 2006 tax year were granted 
a risk capital allowance of 1.3 billion euro for the follow-
ing year. This would correspond to a gross tax advantage 
of  442  million  euro  for  those  companies.  As  all  the 
coordination centres were excluded from the calculation 
of the gross tax advantage on the basis of the annual 
accounts, this figure needs to be added.
The  gross  tax  advantage  for  companies  comprises  two 
elements. The first is static, and expresses the advantage 
which would have applied on the basis of the corporate 
financing structure before introduction of the measure, 
while the second is dynamic and reflects the influence of 
financial flows on the gross tax advantage.
The static component is calculated via a simulation based 
on  the  adjusted  equity  capital  before  the  introduction   
of the reform. In order to avoid any anticipation effects, 
the  2004  balance  sheet  data  were  used.  On  the  basis   
of that information, the theoretical gross tax advantage 
for  companies  would  come  to  1,365  million  euro,  or   
twice  the  government’s  initial  estimate  of  506  million 
euro.
The introduction of the risk capital allowance generated 
substantial dynamic effects, bringing the gross tax advan-
tage for companies to 3,035 million euro at the end of 
2006.  This  was  1.2  billion  euro  higher  than  the  figure 
indicated by the simulation exercise based on the 2004 
data,  excluding  the  impact  of  the  coordination  centres 
which applied the risk capital allowance.
In the case of non-financial corporations, the gross tax 
advantage calculated on the basis of the balance sheet 
structure at the end of the 2006 tax year increased by 
61 p.c. compared to that at the end of 2004. The gross MacroeconoMic and fiscal iMpact of  
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tax advantage for large corporations increased by 87 p.c., 
while  for  SMEs  it  was  32  p.c.  higher.  The  gross  tax 
advantage for credit institutions and insurance companies 
increased by 30 p.c.
In  the  case  of  finance  companies  filing  their  annual 
accounts with the Central Balance Sheet Office, the gross 
tax advantage increased very sharply between 2004 and 
2006. At the end of the latter year, the advantage enjoyed 
by those companies was three times higher than the theo-
retical advantage based on their balance sheet position 
at the end of 2004. These companies include financial 
holding  companies,  credit  institutions  and  investment 
companies. This category also comprises a range of new 
establishments linked to finance companies – credit insti-
tutions  and  insurance  companies  –  or  constituting  the 
finance centres of multinational groups.
In all the branches of activity of non-financial corpora-
tions, the estimated gross tax advantage of the risk capital 
allowance increased between 2004 and 2006. Most of 
that increase can be attributed to the chemical sector and 
the wholesale trade. The marked increase recorded in the 
chemical sector may be due in part to the transfer of one 
coordination centre’s activities to another group company 
which does make use of the risk capital allowance.
TABLE  9  ESTIMATE OF THE GROSS TAX ADVANTAGE REPRESENTED BY THE RISK CAPITAL ALLOWANCE FOR NON-FINANCIAL 









Agriculture, hunting and ﬁshing  ........................... 9 10 11
Mining and quarrying  .................................... 5 5 9
Agricultural and food industries  ........................... 37 41 50
Textiles, clothing and footwear  ............................ 14 14 15
Wood   .................................................. 5 6 7
Paper, publishing and printing  ............................. 18 24 36
Coking, reﬁning, nuclear industries   ........................ 1 2 5
Chemicals and rubber  .................................... 67 163 243
Metallurgy and metalworking  ............................. 35 44 43
Metal manufactures   ...................................... 46 54 96
Other manufacturing industries  ............................ 26 31 36
Energy and water  ....................................... 34 34 36
Construction  ............................................ 55 66 76
Retail trade  ............................................. 91 102 121
Wholesale trade  ......................................... 166 185 237
Hotels and restaurants  ................................... 10 13 17
Transport  ............................................... 46 80 83
Post and telecommunication  .............................. 32 48 56
Financial activities   ........................................ 15 16 31
Real estate activities  ..................................... 152 192 201
Self-operated hire  ....................................... 12 13 24
Services to businesses  .................................... 114 123 166
Services to households  ................................... 22 24 31
Total non-ﬁnancial corporations   ......................... 1,012 1,290 1,633
Source : NBB.
(1)  The data were based on the ﬁnancial position of the companies at the end of the ﬁnancial year.
(2)  For 2004 and 2005, this concerns the theoretical gross tax advantage for companies, since the risk capital allowance had not yet entered into effect at that time.
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Companies whose profits were insufficient to apply the 
risk  capital  allowance  in  2006  can  carry  the  allowance 
forward for seven years and thus create a tax reserve. In 
the case of companies filing their annual accounts with 
the  Central  Balance  Sheet  Office,  the  budgetary  cost 
of  the  formation  of  this  tax  reserve  can  be  estimated 
at around 500 million euro in 2006, assuming that this 
reserve is used in full at the highest tax rate applicable to 
companies.
5.3      Net impact on public finances
According to an approximation based on annual accounts 
data and including the coordination centres which apply 
the risk capital allowance, the gross tax advantage which 
the  risk  capital  allowance  represents  for  companies  is 
estimated at 3,035 million euro for 2006. Nevertheless, 
this approximation needs to be adjusted for a number of 
points.
First, the effect of the authorised capital increases which 
took place in 2006 is fully incorporated in the simulation 
based on the annual accounts, whereas these transactions 
can only be entered in the tax return form pro rata tem-
poris. The overestimation of the impact of these increases 
can be assessed at 374 million euro on the basis of the 
monthly data relating to them for 2006. An adjustment 
also has to be made for SMEs which, instead of using the 
risk capital allowance, continue to apply the tax-exempt 
investment  reserve  rules.  In  addition,  the  simulation 
based on the annual accounts has to be adjusted to take 
account of the part of the corporate equity capital which 
relates  to  the  activities  of  permanent  establishments 
located abroad. Finally, an adjustment has to be made 
to  eliminate  “villa”  companies  and  other  factors,  such 
as valuation differences. This last adjustment is obtained 
via the difference between the sum of the components 
mentioned above and the gross tax advantage of the risk 
capital allowance indicated by the corporation tax assess-
ments. The FPS Finance supplied data on the amount of 
the risk capital allowance for the 2007 tax year  (1). On the 
basis  of  that  information,  the  gross  tax  advantage  for 
companies can be estimated at 2,325 million euro.
If account is also taken of the budgetary costs due to 
abolition of the registration fee on contributions to com-
panies, estimated at 60 million euro, the gross cost of the 
measures introduced by the law of 22 June 2005 comes 
to around 2,385 million euro in 2006.
Nonetheless, the net impact of the tax reform introduced 
by the law of 22 June 2005 on Belgian public revenues 
does  not  correspond  to  the  amount  of  the  gross  tax 
advantage which the risk capital allowance represents for 
companies plus the effect of the abolition of the registra-
tion fee.
In order to proceed from this gross cost to the real impact 
of the measure on Belgian public finances, it is necessary to 
make a number of adjustments, as the law made provision 
for various compensatory measures to limit the negative 
budgetary  repercussions  of  the  reform  (cf.  section  2.2).   
In addition, the inflow of foreign capital inflates the gross 
tax advantage, but most likely has no negative effect on 
Belgian public revenues. The same applies to the reinforce-
ment in equity capital of domestic origin. Moreover, the 
coordination centres whose approval has expired but which 
are pursuing their activities in a different form have in fact 
boosted the gross effect of the risk capital allowance, but 
this conversion has not reduced public revenues.
The rest of the analysis in this chapter examines these 
various  factors  and  then  assesses  their  impact  on  the 
budget ; finally, an overall view of the budgetary impact 
of the reform introduced by the law of 22 June 2005 is 
presented for the year 2006.
Budgetary coMpenSatory MeaSureS  (2)
The law of 22 June 2005 provides for a series of com-
pensatory measures to attenuate the budgetary cost of 
the reform. According to a recent estimate, the proceeds 
of the reduction in the tax exemption for capital gains 
could exceed the amount originally expected by around 
270 million euro. The revenues generated by the other 
compensatory measures should correspond overall to the 
initial estimate.
MacroeconoMic payBack effectS
The  corporation  tax  reform  should  stimulate  economic 
activity  and  employment  and  thus  increase  public  rev-
enues  and  reduce  public  expenditure.  The  government 
had originally assessed these payback effects at 58 million 
euro.  According  to  the  Bank’s  econometric  model,  the 
contraction in the user cost of capital will probably gener-
ate payback effects with positive repercussions on public 
finances amounting to only around 10 million euro in the 
first  year  following  the  tax  reform.  Assuming  that  the 
reform is neutral ex ante for the government budget, the 
payback effects should reach their maximum level after 
three years, at slightly more than 100 million euro.
(1)  These are data on the amount of the assessments as at 30 June 2008. For 
the 2007 tax year, these figures were increased by 2.1 p.c. to take account of 
assessments not yet completed and to obtain an overall view.
(2)  The adjustment relating to “villa” companies is not made here because it 
influences the amount of the risk capital allowance mentioned in the corporation 
tax return, which is therefore already taken into account.MacroeconoMic and fiscal iMpact of  
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inflowS of foreign capital and expanSion of the 
tax BaSe
In the case of foreign capital inflows, a distinction should 
be made between capital contributions which would still 
have been effected without the introduction of the risk 
capital allowance and additional capital inflows. The latter 
have not normally driven up the net cost for the govern-
ment. In principle, the increase in the authorised capital 
of finance companies of foreign origin or the substitution 
of authorised capital for current loans granted by foreign 
establishments  do  not  reduce  the  corporation  tax  rev-
enues collected by the Belgian State. These flows could 
even lead to the development of new economic activities 
and a transfer to Belgium of the tax bases of multinational 
groups, and therefore generate additional revenues for 
the Belgian State.
Thus,  one  might  suggest  that  capital  contributions  of 
foreign origin, which have increased the tax advantage 
for companies by around 465 million euro, are at the very 
least neutral for the government budget.
In addition, assuming that inflows of foreign capital have 
expanded the corporation tax base in Belgium, they may 
even have had a positive impact on public finances. That 
would  be  the  case,  in  particular,  if  the  newly-formed 
finance  companies  or  those  which  have  received  addi-
tional capitalisation apply interest rates to their outstand-
ing loans which exceed the rate of the risk capital allow-
ance. If a return of 5 p.c. – approximately 1.5 percentage 
point above the rate of the tax allowance applicable to 
the 2007 tax year – were obtained on the increase in the 
authorised capital of foreign origin, taxed at the standard 
nominal  rate,  additional  revenues  totalling  280  million 
euro would have been recorded in 2006.
SuBStitution of equity for deBt
The  relatively  limited  rise  in  the  loan  capital  of  non-
financial corporations suggests that borrowing has been 
curbed by the growth of shareholders’ equity. This sub-
stitution  process  increases  the  gross  tax  advantage  for 
companies, but not the net effect on the budget, since 
the rate of the risk capital allowance is generally lower 
than the interest rates payable on borrowings.
Taking  as  the  benchmark  the  smallest  increase  in  debt 
levels recorded between 1994 and 2005, the effect of 
this factor on the gross cost comes to 52 million euro. On 
the basis of the average increase in debt levels during this 
period, the effect comes to 309 million euro. Nonetheless, 
in the latter case there could be substantial double count-
ing due to inflows of foreign capital which have replaced 
the loans previously granted by foreign establishments. 
The figure to be taken into account to adjust for this is 
therefore at least 52 million euro, which corresponds to 
the impact of capital increases financed by households. If 
it is also assumed that the average interest rate applied 
to  borrowings  which  were  not  effected  as  a  result  of 
the substitution of equity for debt would have been one 
percentage point higher than the rate of the risk capital 
allowance,  the  revenues  generated  by  corporation  tax 
would have risen by 15 million euro in 2006.
TABLE  10  IMPACT OF THE BUDGETARY COMPENSATORY MEASURES IN 2006
(millions of euros)
 
Initial estimate  (1)
 
Recent estimate  (2)
 
Abolition of tax credit for SMEs  ........................... 17 14
Cuts in the investment reserve scheme  ..................... 60 58
Abolition of the investment allowance for SMEs  ............. 41 37
Reduction in the tax exemption of capital gains .............. 337 608
Total  .................................................. 454 717
Sources : FPS Finance, NBB.
(1)  According to the report produced on behalf of the Commission for Finance and the Budget at the time of the debate on the law introducing the allowance on risk 
capital.
(2)  On the basis of a recent estimate by the FPS Finance, excluding the tax exemptions for capital gains. In accordance with the method used for the initial estimate, the 
revenues generated by this measure are assessed on the basis of the tax-exempt capital gains on shares in the 2007 tax year.
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retention of the coordination centre capital
One of the aims of the introduction of the risk capital 
allowance was to retain the capital of the coordination 
centres  in  Belgium  following  the  expiry  of  the  centres’ 
approval. When a coordination centre’s approval expires, 
the company can claim the risk capital allowance in the 
same way as other companies. If the equity capital of the 
coordination centre is retained in Belgium, that increases 
the  gross  tax  advantage  of  the  measure.  On  the  one 
hand, it is necessary to take account of how the expiry 
of 44 coordination centre approvals between 2004 and 
September 2006 affects the gross tax advantage of the 
risk capital allowance. On the other hand, it is evident 
from the tax returns that a number of approved coordina-
tion centres have switched to the risk capital allowance 
system.  The  overall  effect  exerted  by  the  coordination 
centres on the gross cost of the measure can be estimated 
at 561 million euro.
It is not easy to estimate the net impact of this factor 
on corporation tax revenues. Coordination centre profits 
already  enjoyed  significant  tax  concessions  and  were 
taxed at a low effective rate. The real budgetary cost also 
depends on the capital which would have remained in 
Belgium even without the reform, and which would have 
been taxed at a standard rate. However, the tax base of 
the coordination centres is extremely mobile, and there 
are various factors which suggest that the introduction 
of the risk capital allowance has resulted in more capital 
remaining in Belgium. In order to assess the net budget-
ary impact, it is therefore assumed that the tax revenues 
generated by the capital retained in Belgium as a result 
of the risk capital allowance compensate for the loss of 
tax revenues on capital which would have remained in 
Belgium even without the reform.
non-recovery of earlier loSSeS
Since, in the corporation tax return form, the risk capital 
allowance applies before the deduction of losses brought 
forward, some companies whose tax base is insufficient 
cannot take advantage of this measure, whereas the situ-
ation would be different if the risk capital allowance could 
have been calculated after deduction of those losses. Such 
a provision increases the amount of the risk capital allow-
ance entered in the corporation tax return, and limits the 
amount deducted in respect of losses brought forward, 
TABLE  11  NET IMPACT ON PUBLIC FINANCES IN 2006 OF THE MEASURES PROVIDED FOR BY THE LAW OF 22 JUNE 2005 
(millions of euros)
 
Gross tax advantage of the risk capital allowance  (1)  ................................................... 3,035
Changes in equity taken into account pro rata temporis  ............................................... –374
Adjustment for permanent establishments abroad  ..................................................... –49
SMEs continuing to apply the investment reserve rules   ................................................. –13
Other adjustments to shareholders’ equity  ........................................................... –274
Abolition of the registration fee on contributions to companies  ......................................... 60
Gross cost  (2)  ..................................................................................... 2,385
Compensatory budgetary measures  ................................................................. –717
Macroeconomic payback effects  (3)   ................................................................... –10
Foreign capital inﬂows and expansion of the tax base  .................................................  –465 to –745
Substitution of debt for equity  ..................................................................... –52 to –67
Impact of the coordination centres  (4)  ................................................................ –561
Non-recovery of earlier losses  (2)  ..................................................................... –149
Net budgetary impact  ........................................................................... ≈ –140 to –430
Sources : CBFA, FPS Finance, NBB.
(1)  On the basis of the 2006 annual accounts; the data were therefore calculated according to the ﬁnancial position of companies at the end of the ﬁnancial year.
(2)  On the basis of the tax return data relating to the 2007 tax year, obtained from the FPS Finance.
(3)  The value stated relates to the macroeconomic payback effects seen in the ﬁrst year following the tax reform.
(4)  This concerns on the one hand the coordination centres which qualiﬁed for the coordination centre tax regime for the 2006 tax year but switched to the risk capital 
allowance in the 2007 tax year, and on the other hand the capital of the coordination centres liquidated during 2005 and 2006, which was transferred to other 
companies established in Belgium.
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but  that  substitution  effect  does  not  influence  the  tax 
payable by the companies since that is zero. The impact of 
this provision can be estimated at 149 million euro.
overview of the Budgetary iMpact
The overall adverse effect on public finances in 2006 of 
the  measures  introduced  by  the  law  of  22  June  2005 
can be estimated at between 140 and 430 million euro. 
However, this estimate is very uncertain and could be too 
low, but equally too high.
5.4    Expected impact of the dynamic effects
The introduction of the risk capital allowance has not yet 
produced all its dynamic effects. The gross tax advantage 
for  companies  could  still  increase  considerably  in  the 
coming years, as a result of various developments.
The first factor concerns the increase in the equity capi-
tal which has occurred in recent years and will probably 
continue. Thus, substantial inflows of foreign capital were 
recorded in 2007, and again in the first months of 2008. 
The equity of companies could also increase as a result 
of tax optimisation techniques. In practice, therefore, the 
risk capital allowance could concern a large proportion of 
the total consolidated capital of companies, rather than 
just their shareholders’ equity. That is particularly true in 
cases where the sum of the equity capital of companies 
with cross-shareholdings exceeds the level of the group‘s 
consolidated equity.
The abolition of the coordination centre regime will also 
increase the gross tax advantage for companies, since it 
can be expected that in many cases the activities of these 
centres will be pursued in the form of companies using 
the risk capital allowance.
In addition, the rise in interest rates on linear bonds is 
driving up the basic rate used to calculate the risk capi-
tal allowance. Being dependent on the interest rate on 
ten-year  linear  bonds  issued  by  the  Belgian  State,  that 
rate has already risen from 3.442 p.c. in the 2007 tax 
year  to  4.307  p.c.  for  2009,  and  it  could  yet  increase   
further.
Finally,  there  is  the  use  of  the  tax  reserves  formed  by   
companies which had not generated sufficient profits, in 
the tax year 2007, to take full advantage of the measure.
In principle, the net impact on public revenues of foreign 
capital inflows and the conversion of coordination centres 
is  still  modest  and  could  even  be  positive.  The  foreign 
capital  contributions  and  the  substitution  of  debt  for 
equity financing could expand the corporation tax base in 
Belgium, notably as a result of effects relating to the allo-
cation of profits among the various companies belonging 
to the same multinational group. The positive influence of 
the macroeconomic payback effects on public revenues, 
resulting from the revival of economic growth, could also 
increase slightly.
Conversely, other factors could attenuate the net budget-
ary impact. That is true of the increase in the rate used 
to calculate the risk capital allowance, the use of the tax 
reserve created by the unused portion of the tax allow-
ance and the changes made to the structure of companies 
or groups of companies in connection with tax optimisa-
tion techniques. A number of these factors could prove 
quite significant. It is therefore still possible that, in the 
future, they could have a serious adverse effect on the 
public revenues generated by corporation tax.
Of course, the exact repercussions will depend on what 
happens  with  these  factors.  Thus,  the  budgetary  costs 
could increase if corporate operating profits decline sig-
nificantly – as they generally do in a period of slackening 
activity – and if interest rates increase.
In any case, the budgetary impact of the measures intro-
duced by the law of 22 June 2005, as estimated in this 
study, only relates to the year 2006, and at the moment it 
is still uncertain how the dynamic effects of the introduc-
tion of the risk capital allowance will develop. It will there-
fore be several years before an overview can be obtained, 
once the coordination centre regime has been abolished 
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TABLE  3.1  CAPITAL MOVEMENTS OF ALL BELGIAN COMPANIES AFFILIATED TO FOREIGN COMPANIES : TOTAL














1. F oreign capital contributions to resident 
ﬁrms  .................................. 64.9 56.2 70.3 60.1 76.2 126.6
1.1  Funds reinvested abroad by the ﬁrms 
concerned  .......................... 35.7 29.2 37.4 31.6 48.5 70.1
In the form of equity capital  ......... 17.0 11.7 16.4 17.4 3.4 3.3
In the form of interﬁrm loans  ........ 18.7 17.5 21.0 14.2 45.1 66.8
1.2  Foreign capital contributions remaining in 
Belgium  ............................ 29.2 27.0 32.9 28.5 27.7 56.5
2. F oreign capital withdrawals from resident 
ﬁrms   .................................. 31.3 47.9 51.9 37.1 48.0 85.4
2.1  Funds disinvested abroad by the ﬁrms 
concerned  .......................... 5.7 18.5 14.8 16.2 6.7 91.1
In the form of equity capital  ......... –0.9 9.2 –2.5 1.9 –1.8 19.7
In the form of interﬁrm loans  ........ 6.6 9.4 17.3 14.3 8.4 71.4
2.2  Foreign capital withdrawals not offset by 
foreign disinvestments  ................ 25.6 29.4 37.2 20.9 41.4 –5.7
Change in inward foreign direct investment 
(1 – 2)  .................................... 33.6 8.2 18.4 23.0 28.2 41.1
Net foreign investments by the ﬁrms concerned 
(1.1 – 2.1)  ................................. 30.0 10.7 22.6 15.4 41.8 –21.0
Actual capital increase (+) or reduction (–) in the 
ﬁrms concerned  
(1.2 – 2.2)  ................................. 3.6 –2.4 –4.2 7.6 –13.6 62.2
Source : NBB.
(1)  Direct shareholdings are deﬁned by the holding of at least 10 p.c. of the shares or voting rights.
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TABLE  3.2  CAPITAL MOVEMENTS IN COORDINATION CENTRES AFFILIATED TO FOREIGN COMPANIES














1. F oreign capital contributions to resident 
ﬁrms  .................................. 13.4 21.6 32.3 18.6 34.9 13.5
1.1  Funds reinvested abroad by the ﬁrms 
concerned  .......................... 16.6 12.2 18.4 10.1 38.9 1.9
In the form of equity capital  ......... 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
In the form of interﬁrm loans  ........ 16.6 12.2 18.4 10.1 38.9 1.9
1.2  Foreign capital contributions remaining in 
Belgium  ............................ –3.2 9.4 13.9 8.5 –4.0 11.5
2. F oreign capital withdrawals from resident 
ﬁrms   .................................. 8.4 7.5 22.8 16.2 22.7 32.8
2.1  Funds disinvested abroad by the ﬁrms 
concerned  .......................... 6.2 6.1 12.9 12.9 7.7 65.2
In the form of equity capital  ......... 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.3
In the form of interﬁrm loans  ........ 6.2 6.1 12.9 12.9 7.7 65.6
2.2  Foreign capital withdrawals not offset by 
foreign disinvestments  ................ 2.2 1.4 9.9 3.3 15.0 –32.5
Change in inward foreign direct investment 
(1 – 2)  .................................... 4.9 14.2 9.5 2.5 12.2 –19.3
Net foreign investments by the ﬁrms concerned 
(1.1 – 2.1)  ................................. 10.4 6.1 5.5 –2.8 31.2 –63.3
Actual capital increase (+) or reduction (–) in the 
ﬁrms concerned  
(1.2 – 2.2)  ................................. –5.4 8.1 4.0 5.2 –19.0 44.0
Source : NBB.
(1)  Direct shareholdings are deﬁned by the holding of at least 10 p.c. of the shares or voting rights.
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TABLE  3.3  CAPITAL MOVEMENTS IN BELGIAN COMPANIES AFFILIATED TO FOREIGN COMPANIES EXCLUDING COORDINATION 
CENTRES














1. F oreign capital contributions to resident 
ﬁrms  .................................. 51.6 34.5 38.0 41.5 41.3 113.1
1.1  Funds reinvested abroad by the ﬁrms 
concerned  .......................... 19.2 17.0 19.0 21.5 9.6 68.2
In the form of equity capital  ......... 17.0 11.7 16.4 17.4 3.4 3.3
In the form of interﬁrm loans  ........ 2.2 5.3 2.7 4.1 6.2 64.9
1.2  Foreign capital contributions remaining in 
Belgium  ............................ 32.4 17.5 19.0 19.9 31.7 44.9
2. F oreign capital withdrawals from resident 
ﬁrms  .................................. 22.9 40.4 29.1 21.0 25.3 52.7
2.1  Funds disinvested abroad by the ﬁrms 
concerned  .......................... –0.5 12.4 1.9 3.4 –1.0 25.9
In the form of equity capital  ......... –0.9 9.2 –2.5 1.9 –1.8 20.1
In the form of interﬁrm loans  ........ 0.4 3.3 4.4 1.4 0.7 5.8
2.2  Foreign capital withdrawals not offset by 
foreign disinvestments  ................ 23.4 28.0 27.3 17.6 26.3 26.8
Change in inward foreign direct investment 
(1 – 2)  .................................... 28.7 –5.9 8.9 20.5 16.0 60.4
Net foreign investments by the ﬁrms concerned 
(1.1 – 2.1)  ................................. 19.7 4.6 17.2 18.2 10.6 42.3
Actual capital increase (+) or reduction (–) in the 
ﬁrms concerned  
(1.2 – 2.2)  ................................. 9.0 –10.5 –8.3 2.4 5.4 18.1
Source : NBB.
(1)  Direct shareholdings are deﬁned by the holding of at least 10 p.c. of the shares or voting rights.
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TABLE  4.1  CHANGES IN THE AUTHORISED CAPITAL OF COORDINATION CENTRES STILL APPROVED IN 2004  (1)










1. A pproval expired between 2004 and September 2006
Capital increases ................................... 164 622 373 708
Indeterminate origin   ............................... 0 1 0 0
Domestic origin   ................................... 0 1 0 95
Foreign origin  .................................... 164 620 373 614
Capital reductions  ................................. 13,151 4,627 234 365
Indeterminate destination  .......................... 0 0 0 0
Domestic destination  .............................. 6,015 4,622 149 81
Foreign destination   ................................ 7,136 5 85 285
Net changes in capital  ............................. –12,987 –4,005 139 343
Indeterminate origin or destination  .................. 0 1 0 0
Domestic origin or destination  ...................... –6,015 –4,622 –149 14
Foreign origin or destination   ........................ –6,972 615 288 329
2. A pproval expired between September 2006 and 
November 2007
Capital increases ................................... 50 1,544 4,518 5,200
Indeterminate origin   ............................... 50 0 0 0
Domestic origin   ................................... 0 1,544 4,508 5,200
Foreign origin  .................................... 0 0 10 0
Capital reductions  ................................. 1,653 7,381 4,253 1,508
Indeterminate destination  .......................... 0 0 0 0
Domestic destination  .............................. 1,507 5,852 3,691 1,431
Foreign destination   ................................ 146 1,529 562 78
Net changes in capital  ............................. –1,603 –5,837 265 3,692
Indeterminate origin or destination  .................. 50 0 0 0
Domestic origin or destination  ...................... –1,507 –4,308 818 3,769
Foreign origin or destination   ........................ –146 –1,529 –552 –78
3. A pproval expired between November 2007 and March 
2008
Capital increases ................................... 10,579 4,363 1,161 5,566
Indeterminate origin   ............................... 0 0 0 0
Domestic origin   ................................... 2,897 1,562 673 199
Foreign origin  .................................... 7,682 2,801 487 5,366
Capital reductions  ................................. 3,474 482 5,019 3,839
Indeterminate destination  .......................... 0 0 0 0
Domestic destination  .............................. 191 351 0 1,686
Foreign destination   ................................ 3,283 131 5,019 2,153
Net changes in capital  ............................. 7,105 3,881 –3,858 1,726
Indeterminate origin or destination  .................. 0 0 0 0
Domestic origin or destination  ...................... 2,706 1,212 673 –1,487
Foreign origin or destination   ........................ 4,399 2,670 –4,532 3,214
Sources :  FPS Finance, NBB.
(1)  Any liquidation gains or losses were taken into account.
 
Annex 4 40











4. A pproval still valid in March 2008
Capital increases ................................... 25,607 6,864 17,395 7,236
Indeterminate origin   ............................... 25 12 25 11
Domestic origin   ................................... 4,848 2,627 4,395 776
Foreign origin  .................................... 20,734 4,225 12,975 6,449
Capital reductions  ................................. 752 1,335 13,412 1
Indeterminate destination  .......................... 0 0 0 0
Domestic destination  .............................. 752 497 1,756 0
Foreign destination   ................................ 0 838 11,656 1
Net changes in capital  ............................. 24,855 5,529 3,983 7,236
Indeterminate origin or destination  .................. 25 12 25 11
Domestic origin or destination  ...................... 4,096 2,130 2,639 776
Foreign origin or destination   ........................ 20,734 3,387 1,319 6,449
5. T otal capital transactions of coordination centres
Capital increases ................................... 36,400 13,394 23,447 18,710
Indeterminate origin   ............................... 75 13 25 11
Domestic origin   ................................... 7,745 5,734 9,577 6,270
Foreign origin  .................................... 28,580 7,646 13,845 12,429
Capital reductions  ................................. 19,030 13,825 22,918 5,714
Indeterminate destination  .......................... 0 0 0 0
Domestic destination  .............................. 8,466 11,322 5,596 3,198
Foreign destination   ................................ 10,564 2,504 17,322 2,516
Net changes in capital  ............................. 17,370 –432 528 12,996
Indeterminate origin or destination  .................. 75 13 25 11
Domestic origin or destination  ...................... –720 –5,587 3,981 3,072
Foreign origin or destination   ........................ 18,015 5,143 –3,477 9,913
Sources :  FPS Finance, NBB.
(1)  Any liquidation gains or losses were taken into account.
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Assessment of the impact of the risk capital allowance on the Belgian economy
1.  Implementation
The potential impact of the risk capital allowance on the Belgian economy is assessed by means of the Bank’s quarterly 
“Noname” model. As in most models, this assessment is conducted by considering that the effects of corporation tax 
on company decisions will be felt via the change in the user cost of capital.
Long-term investment demand, conducted by profit maximising companies, depends on output with a unitary elasticity, 
and on the ratio between the capital cost and the production price with an elasticity determined by the elasticity of the 
substitution of capital for labour. In the short term, the additional accelerator effect produced by cash flows must also 
be taken into account.
User cost of capital
This tax measure is first introduced into the model by varying the cost of capital. There are various definitions of the 
cost of capital, depending on the assumptions made or the desired degree of complexity, but all the measures comprise 
as their main element the opportunity cost of the funds used to finance the project : a lower cost typically results in a 
higher level of investment. In the absence of taxation, the opportunity cost is equal to the risk-free interest rate plus a 
risk premium (rp). A very minor restriction is imposed by assuming that the risk premium is independent of the measure 
in question. The opportunity cost, co, depends on the interest rate, R, on the return after tax required for an investment 
financed by equity, RE, on the return after tax required for an investment financed by debt, RD, and on the proportion of 
the investments financed by equity, ßE. This opportunity cost can be written as follows :
co = ßE.RE + (1 – ßE).RD
Before the risk capital allowance had been introduced, only the interest on debts was deductible so that :
RE = rpE + R  
RD = rpD + (1– t).R
where t is the rate of corporation tax.
If the equity finance also becomes deductible, the rate of return required on these investments becomes :
RE = rpE + (1– t).R  
RD = rpD + (1– t).R
The introduction of the measure therefore corresponds to a reduction in the opportunity cost equalling
co –coIN = �ßE .(rpE + R) + (1 – ßE).(rpD + (1 – t).R)�  
  – �ßE .(rpE +(1 – t).R) + (1 – ßE).(rpD + (1 – t).R)�
or :
εco = – ßE.t.R
which will be the shock applied to the model.
Annex 542
On the basis of the aggregate figures for all non-financial corporations, it seems that over the latest five years available, 
i.e. 2002-2006, the average of ßE is 43 p.c. The ex ante shock to the opportunity cost is therefore :
εco = – 0,43.0,33.R
For the 2007 tax year, this rate R is set at 3.442 p.c. (3.942 p.c. for SMEs).
Ex ante budgetary impact
To assess the ex ante effect of the measure on corporate cash flows it is necessary to know the budgetary cost, as this 
cost corresponds to a transfer of resources from general government to the business sector. That cost is particularly hard 
to assess since the measure does not apply only to new business investments but concerns the whole of the corporate 
balance sheet. That assessment therefore requires accounting and tax definitions which are beyond the scope of the 
model ; in addition, there is a set of compensatory measures concerning corporate taxation, the impact of which is 
difficult to ascertain. That is why two simulations were carried out. In the first, the measure is assumed to be neutral for 
the budget ; in the second, it is said to cost one billion euro per annum, or 0.3 p.c. of GDP. Taking account of the volatility 
seen in the data on both cash flows and corporation tax, the shock is stated directly as a nominal amount rather than 
by modifying the rate of corporation tax.
2.  Results
In each simulation, the measure is assumed not to influence the wage negotiations, so that there is no change in labour 
costs excluding indexation. No fiscal rule is activated ensuring that the public debt adheres to a predefined path, so that 
the higher public debt caused by the measure is not offset by raising other taxes or cutting expenditure.
Table 1 presents the effects on long-term investment demand where investment reacts to production and the user cost 
of capital. The shock is applied to the interest rate present in the user cost of capital. Its impact on the actual user cost 
also depends on the level of the risk premium : the higher that premium, the weaker will be the proportional effect 
of the shock on the user cost of capital. As already stated, this risk premium is kept constant (at 10 p.c. per annum, 
corresponding to the value used when estimating the model).
The reduction in the cost of capital stimulates investment demand which in turn boosts domestic demand and demand 
for imports. The strengthening of domestic demand leads to expanding employment and lower unemployment. If the 
budgetary cost of the measure is zero, business investment increases by a maximum of 0.8 p.c. and employment expands 
by around 3,000 units. Such an adjustment to the tax system that is related to investment funding has practically no 
effect on prices.
Table 2 shows the cumulative long-term and accelerator effects generated by short-term cash flows when they increase 
by one billion euro.
If the measure causes a reduction in corporation tax, it increases the companies’ cash flows. These additional cash flows 
give rise to investment expansion in excess of that due to the capital-labour substitution resulting from the reduction in 
the user cost of capital. This cash-flow effect is greater the higher the ex ante budgetary effect, and hence the impact 
on cash flows. If the ex ante budgetary effect is one billion euro, the impact on business investment is 1.6 p.c., and 
the impact on employment is around 6,700 units. Apart from a very small increase in personal income tax and social 
contributions resulting from job creation, the payback effects on public finances are relatively weak.MacroeconoMic and fiscal iMpact of  
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TABLE  5.1   EFFECTS OF THE REDUCTION IN THE COST OF CAPITAL FOLLOWING THE INTRODUCTION OF THE RISK CAPITAL 
ALLOWANCE IN A SCENARIO OF EX ANTE BUDGET NEUTRALITY













HICP  ................................................... 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01
HICP excluding energy  ................................... 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01
Private consumption deﬂator  .............................. 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01
Deﬂator of the gross ﬁxed capital formation   ................ –0.01 –0.01 0.01 0.01 –0.01
GDP deﬂator   ............................................ –0.00 –0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Unit labour cost  ......................................... –0.01 –0.01 0.04 0.06 0.05
Hourly labour cost  ..................................... 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02
Productivity  ........................................... 0.01 0.02 0.00 –0.02 –0.04
Real compensation per employee  .......................... 0.00 –0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Import deﬂator  .......................................... 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01
Export deﬂator  .......................................... 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
Terms of trade  (1)  ......................................... –0.00 –0.02 –0.01 0.00 0.00
Economic activity (at constant prices)
GDP  ................................................... 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04
Private consumption  ................................... 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Public consumption  .................................... 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Investment  ........................................... 0.13 0.48 0.55 0.53 0.52
Exports   ............................................... 0.00 0.00 –0.01 –0.02 –0.02
Imports  .............................................. 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07
Real disposable income of households  ...................... 0.00 –0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Household savings ratio (p.c. of disposable income)  .......... 0.00 –0.01 –0.01 0.00 0.00
Labour market
Unemployment rate  (1)  .................................... 0.00 –0.02 –0.04 –0.06 –0.06
Total employment  ....................................... 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.07
of which : market sector  ................................ 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.08
Budgetary changes (in p.c. of GDP)
Total revenues  (1)  ......................................... 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
Total expenditure  (1)  ...................................... 0.00 0.00 0.00 –0.01 –0.01
Net ﬁnancing balance  (1)  .................................. 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Primary balance  (1)   ........................................ 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Public debt  (1)   ............................................ 0.00 –0.01 –0.04 –0.07 –0.10
Gross ﬁxed capital formation
Housing  ................................................ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
General government  ..................................... 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Enterprises   .............................................. 0.19 0.69 0.78 0.77 0.76
Source : NBB.
(1)  Absolute deviations from the baseline simulation.
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TABLE  5.2  EFFECTS OF THE REDUCTION IN THE COST OF CAPITAL FOLLOWING THE INTRODUCTION OF THE RISK CAPITAL 
ALLOWANCE ACCOMPANIED BY AN EX ANTE BUDGETARY COST OF ONE BILLION EURO PER ANNUM













HICP  ................................................... 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.04
HICP excluding energy  ................................... 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.04
Private consumption deﬂator  .............................. 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.04
Deﬂator of the gross ﬁxed capital formation   ................ –0.01 –0.02 0.01 0.01 –0.01
GDP deﬂator   ............................................ 0.00 –0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Unit labour cost  ......................................... –0.02 –0.02 0.07 0.11 0.11
Hourly labour cost  ..................................... 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.05
Productivity  ........................................... 0.02 0.05 0.01 –0.04 –0.07
Real compensation per employee  .......................... 0.00 –0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01
Import deﬂator  .......................................... 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.02
Export deﬂator  .......................................... 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02
Terms of trade  (1)  ......................................... 0.00 –0.03 –0.04 –0.02 0.00
Economic activity (at constant prices)
GDP  ................................................... 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10
Private consumption  ................................... 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
Public consumption  .................................... 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Investment  ........................................... 0.21 0.86 1.12 1.15 1.12
Exports   ............................................... 0.00 –0.01 –0.02 –0.03 –0.03
Imports  .............................................. 0.03 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.15
Real disposable income of households  ...................... 0.00 –0.02 –0.01 0.01 0.02
Household savings ratio (p.c. of disposable income)  .......... 0.00 –0.02 –0.02 –0.01 0.00
Labour market
Unemployment rate  (1)  .................................... 0.00 –0.03 –0.08 –0.11 –0.13
Total employment  ....................................... 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.15
of which : market sector  ................................ 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.15 0.18
Budgetary changes (in p.c. of GDP)
Total revenues  (1)  ......................................... –0.31 –0.27 –0.23 –0.22 –0.22
Total expenditure  (1)  ...................................... 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 –0.02
Net ﬁnancing balance  (1)  .................................. –0.32 –0.29 –0.26 –0.25 –0.25
Primary balance  (1)   ........................................ –0.31 –0.27 –0.23 –0.21 –0.20
Public debt  (1)   ............................................ 0.20 0.48 0.72 0.94 1.14
Gross ﬁxed capital formation
Housing  ................................................ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
General government  ..................................... 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Enterprises   .............................................. 0.30 1.25 1.61 1.64 1.61
Source : NBB.
(1)  Absolute deviations from the baseline simulation.
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Annex 7